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THE WYOMING CRIMINAL CODE
REVISITED: REFLECTIONS AFTER FIFTEEN

YEARS
Theodore E. Lauer'
The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982 has been in effect since July 1,
1983, a period of nearly fifteen years. During that time there have been
thousands of prosecutions under the Criminal Code, and hundreds of
Wyoming Supreme Court decisions construing the Code's provisions. The
Wyoming Legislature has frequently amended various Code sections, has
repealed a few sections and has enacted some new ones.'
Experience is now sufficient to justify a review of the Criminal Code,
with an eye toward possible piecemeal or wholesale revision. Merely to review
the Code in its entirety is an onerous task, not to be undertaken lightly.
Meaningful review must be done by the Wyoming Legislature, which is
currently preoccupied with serious problems of financing primary and
secondary education as well as how to fund other necessary functions of state
government. Unless Wyoming's criminal law is perceived to be "broke," the
Legislature, given its limited resources, will be understandably reluctant to
"fix" it.
This article does not purport to be the thoroughgoing review of the
Criminal Code which might now prove beneficial. It is nothing more than a
loose collection of somewhat unorganized impressions, acquired over the
decade and a half since the Legislature adopted the Code in 1983. During that
time the author has been privileged to supervise the Prosecution Assistance
Program at the College of Law, and has thereby gained a working
acquaintance with the Criminal Code. This article is only a beginning, written
in the hope that it may provide a stimulus to a more thorough and organized
study of the Code and to an improvement in Wyoming's criminal law.
I.

CODE REVISION SINCE 1983

The 1982 Wyoming Legislature adopted the Criminal Code and gave it
an effective date of July 1, 1983.2 However, before the Code went into effect,
the 1983 Legislature made amendments in the great majority of the Code's

* Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
1. A hasty count of Criminal Code sections shows that since 1983, five Code sections have been
repealed and 14 new sections have been created.
2. 1982 Wyoming Sess. Laws ch. 75.
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sections., Through 1998, thirty-six of the Code's 204 sections remain
unchanged since their original 1982 enactment, while ninety-one other
sections have not been changed since the Code went into effect. Since 1983,
some thirty-six sections have been amended once; sixteen sections have been
amended twice; three sections have been amended three times; and three
sections have been amended four times.'
This tally seems to show that while the Legislature has not been
overactive in revising the Criminal Code, neither has it been hesitant to do so.
In light of the fact that fifty-eight sections have been amended at least once,
plus the adoption of fourteen sections and the repeal of five others, it is evident
that the Legislature regards the Code as somewhat less than sacrosanct. Given
the pace of present-day life in the United States, one should not be surprised to
discover that over a fifteen year period more than one third of the Criminal
Code has been amended, enacted or repealed.
Numbers alone, however, do not tell the story of whether the
Legislature's nearly constant attention to the Criminal Code has been salutary,
or whether there are parts of the Code which could stand revision in the public
interest. That is an entirely different matter, some of whose fabric will be
examined in this article. But as might be expected from a citizen legislature
which meets for a very few frantic weeks each year, some of the changes have
been good ones and some have been bad.
II.

THE PATH OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE IN WYOMING

It is difficult to know whether we live in an age in which there is a great
deal more criminal conduct than in prior times, or whether we are experiencing
a heightened awareness of crime in our communities, or perhaps some
combination of both. One thing is plain: much more human activity is now
subject to criminal sanctions than was the case in earlier, so-called simpler
times, and with the increase in the number and reach of statutory crimes, we
are seeing a lot more crime.
Wyoming has followed the pattern of the rest of our nation, expanding
the reach of the criminal law to new forms of conduct, and increasing both the
potential punishment for crimes and the sentences actually imposed in
individual cases. As a result, the number of persons occupying our prisons and

3. 1983 Wyoming Sess. Laws ch. 171.
4. The champion sections with four amendments each are WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-106 (vehicular
homicide), § 6-5-208 (taking controlled substances into jails and institutions), and § 6-7-101 (the definitions for gambling) (Michic 1997). This may be revelatory of the nature of American life in the late 20th
century. The astute observer will note that the figures do not add up to the 204 sections claimed earlier to
be found in the Code. The reason is that 14 new and five repealed sections have not been included in the
count.
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jails has grown exponentially in recent decades. Much of this growth can be
attributed to the "war against drugs," in that a significant percentage of inmates
have been sentenced for controlled substance violations. But penalties for
traditional crimes have also been increased. And, as will be seen, the sideeffect of adopting new statutes such as the general inchoate offenses,
particularly attempt and conspiracy, has been lengthier sentences of
incarceration.
Societal sensibilities and sensitivities have experienced a great change in
recent times, and the law has been fairly quick to respond. Punishing the
physical and sexual abuse of women and children has become a matter of high
priority in most communities. The incidence and consequences of driving
motor vehicles under the influence of alcohol are matters of great public
concern. Crime is seen as an offense against persons, rather than against the
state, and crime victims are becoming active participants in criminal
prosecutions. In all these areas, law enforcement has intensified, and offenders
are subjected to continually increasing penalties. Over all, these changes must
be regarded as a good thing. Yet while we might hope to consider ourselves a
kinder, gentler society, the fact is that we accord a great deal less tolerance
toward many forms of conduct considered criminal, with the result that
transgressions which once were overlooked or produced mild sanctions are
now the subject of penalties which formerly would have been regarded as
Draconian. Whether more intense enforcement and harsher penalties will solve
the "crime problem" is not known, but our society is proceeding upon the
premise that the answer lies in that direction. Given the observable and
possibly immutable characteristics of human beings, it may be that some not
insignificant quantity of undesirable conduct will always be with us.
What has all of this to do with the content of the Wyoming Criminal
Code? Perhaps very little. It may be that the shape and content of our criminal
statutes have an imperceptible effect upon the behavior of persons in our
society. The real causes of antisocial conduct-and the real cures, if there are
any-may well lie far outside the law. Criminals, after all, do not study the
criminal code. On the other hand, the criminal code is a human creation, and as
humans (and perhaps even more so as lawyers) we pride ourselves in the
rationality of our institutions. A rational criminal code will never be a thing of
beauty, but its consistency is a thing we value, and it is an article of faith that a
rational law will more likely be accepted and obeyed than an irrational one.
Therefore, it is important that our criminal laws be consistent and predictable,
and that we strive to eliminate irrationalities and consequences which could
not reasonably be foreseen.
It is with the content of the Wyoming Criminal Code, and some of its
irrationalities and unintended consequences that the remainder of this article
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will deal. The arrangement of the observations will generally follow the
organization of the Criminal Code itself, starting with the general provisions
and ending with sentencing.
III. GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL CODE

The Code's general provisions, which are meant to apply to all of the
crimes within the Code, give rise to a number of problems of definition and
construction. Some of these matters arise under the specific language of the
Code's sections, and some are generic matters not found in the Code sections,
but inherent to substantive criminal law.
A.

Partiesto Crimes

Crimes may be committed by persons aciing alone, or by two or more
persons acting together. At common law, sharp distinctions were drawn
between principals, or the persons who were the immediate perpetrators of
crimes, and accessories, who in some manner aided the principals, either
before, during or after the commission of the crime.' Because of the highly
technical distinctions between principals and accessories at common law,
combined with arbitrary limitations (e.g., an accessory could not be tried until
after the principal had been convicted), most jurisdictions have sought to
simplify the matter by statute.
In Wyoming, section 6-1-201(a) of the Criminal Code provides:
A person who knowingly aids or abets in the commission of a felony, or who counsels, encourages, hires, commands or procures a
felony to be committed, is an accessory before the fact.
Section 6-1-201(b) goes on to provide that accessories before the fact' are to be
treated in criminal prosecutions as if they were principals.
One potential problem with section 6-1-201(a) is that it expressly applies
only to persons who aid or abet in the commission of afelony. It says nothing
about misdemeanors. At common law, all parties to misdemeanors were
regarded as principals, and there was no need to provide in a statute that
persons who aided and abetted misdemeanors were to be dealt with as

5. The classical definition of parties to crime at common law is found in 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 34-40 (1769).

6. Accessories after the fact, who provide assistance to persons who have already committed

crimes, are treated separately in the Wyoming Criminal Code, in section 6-5-202. They are subject to
considerably reduced penalties, in recognition of the fact that their crime is not involvement inthe commission of the original offense, but rather consists of interfering with the apprehension and prosecution
of persons who have committed offenses.
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principals.7 But section 6-1-102(a) expressly abolishes common law crimes,
and goes on to state that "[n]o conduct constitutes a crime unless it is described
as a crime in this act or in another statute of this state." This leaves open the
question whether persons who aid and abet in misdemeanors have committed
"conduct" which "constitutes a crime." At least one Wyoming district court
judge has concluded that a person who aids and abets a misdemeanor cannot
be punished.'
Arguably the decision that a person who aids and abets a misdemeanor is
not subject to criminal prosecution is patently wrong. But knowledge of that
wrongness depends upon an understanding of the now arcane common law
relating to parties to crimes, and judges and lawyers can be at least partially
forgiven for not being familiar with the common law. A person who reads the
Criminal Code can reasonably come to the conclusion that persons who aid
and abet misdemeanors are not to be punished. At the very least, the Criminal
Code should clearly state the applicable principles of law, so that it does not
become necessary to resort to Blackstone or other uncommon sources to
determine the outcome of cases in justice courts in Wyoming. Section 6-1201(a) should be amended to reflect that all persons involved in the
commission of misdemeanors are subject to punishment.'
Section 6-1-201 appears to make clear that it is no longer necessary to
distinguish in criminal proceedings between principals and accessories before
the fact. An accessory before the fact "[m]ay be indicted, informed against,
tried and convicted as if he were a principal." This seems to authorize charging
defendants without reference to whether they are principals or accessories. Yet
many Wyoming prosecutors have difficulty in applying the statute in that
manner, and retain the practice of designating accessories before the fact as
such.

7. The common law principle was recognized in State v. Weekley, 275 P. 122 (Wyo. 1929), where it
was held that in the absence of a Wyoming statute on pasties to misdemeanors, the common law would
apply under section 4547, WYO. COMP. L. 1920, which adopted the common law of England as the rle
of decision in Wyoming when not inconsistent with Wyoming laws. Section 4547 is now found in section 8-1-101.
8. In an unreported juvenile delinquency case involving a charge of cruelty to animals, the court
took the position that the absence of any provision in the Criminal Code respecting aiders and abettors in
misdemeanor cases reflected a legislative intent that such persons not be subject to punishment. An aider
and abettor was therefore acquitted. This, of course, was almost certainly not the legislative intent; in all
probability the Legislature had no intent whatsoever on the issue.
9. The amendment would be simple enough: "A person who knowingly aids or abets in the commission of a crime, or who counsels, encourages, hires, commands or procures a crime to be committed,
is an accessory before the fact." While arguably this would do violence to the common law, it has the
virtue of making the matter entirely clear, when followed by section 6-1.201(b), which expresses that
accessories before the fact are to be treated the same as if they were principals.
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Venue

Venue is not dealt with directly in the Wyoming Criminal Code. The
notion of venue in criminal cases is governed by Article 1, Section 10 of the
Wyoming Constitution, which originally provided in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right... to a
speedy trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed.
In 1976, Wyoming voters approved an amendment to this section, adding this
fentence:
When the location of the offense cannot be established with certainty, venue may be placed in the county or district where the corpus delicti is found, or in any county or district in which the victim
was transported."°
The statute governing venue in criminal cases, section 1-7-102, provides that
criminal cases "shall be tried in the county in which the indictment or offense
charged is found, except as otherwise provided by law." This statute further
contains language nearly identical to the 1976 constitutional amendment.
Venue has been considered to be a necessary element of every offense, so
that the Wyoming pattern jury instructions require the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime was committed in the particular county.,, But
what if venue cannot be proved with precision? If venue is an element of every
crime, then if it cannot be proved where a crime was committed, will the
offender escape punishment? This is a prosecutor's nightmare. The
constitutional provision makes some accommodation for crimes against
persons: "Venue may be placed in the county or district where the corpus
delicti is found, or in any county or district in which the victim was
transported."' 2 But it offers little guidance or assistance in many cases.
Traditionally, persons and property remained fairly static. In the modern
world, however, a crime may be committed in several different locales, or may
be committed in such a manner that it is impossible to prove just where the
crime occurred. Wyoming's statutes make no provision for how or where such

10. The amendment was adopted on November 2, 1976. See 1975 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Senate Joint
Resolution No. 2 at 474.
11. The testimony of the victim, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to establish venue. McArtor v.
State, 699 P.2d 288, 291-92 (Wyo. 1985).
12. The framers of the constitutional amendment have subjected themselves to a measure of ridicule
by their apparent belief that "corpus delicti" refers to the body of the victim, rather than to the body of
evidence which proves the crime. See, e.g., BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 344 (6th ed. 1990).
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crimes are to be prosecuted. When crimes involving the use of telephones or
other electronic media are concerned, it is possible to place the venue where
the call or other transmission was received." Historically, the Wyoming
Supreme Court held that venue was properly laid in the county where a
libelous communication was received." And if it cannot be proved where
property was stolen, a person may be prosecuted in the county where he is
found in unlawful possession of that property." But there are also cases in
which it cannot be proved where the crime occurred, as where property has
been taken from a vehicle during its travels across the state, or a small child is
sexually abused in a vehicle while traveling with an adult.
One other aspect of venue may cause difficulty. In property crimes,
where a number of small crimes are committed as a part of a common scheme
or within a particular period of time, it is possible to aggregate the value of the
property affected in order to reach the level necessary to charge a felony. This
is true as to property destruction, 16 larceny and related offenses," and
insufficient funds checks." However, it is unclear as to how the aggregation is
to occur when the crimes are committed in more than one county.
Some provision needs to be made in the Criminal Code to accommodate
cases where it cannot be proved with certainty where the crime occurred,
where the crime occurred in several counties, or where an aggregation of
offenses were committed in more than one county.
C. Merger of Offenses
A single act may violate more than one criminal statute. If it does, the
defendant can be convicted of violation of each statute, so long as each
requires an element which the other does not. This is one aspect of the rule of
Blockburgerv. UnitedStates:"l
The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is
whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not.
13. McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1993).
14. State v. Levand, 262 P. 24 (Wyo. 1927).
15. See Hunter v. State, 704 P.2d 713 (Wyo. 1985). Hunter was apprehended in Albany County,
driving a Cadillac which had been stolen in Michigan. When Michigan declined to extradite, Hunter was
prosecuted in Wyoming for concealing stolen property, under section 6-3-403.
16. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-201(c) (Michie 1997).
17. ld § 6-3-410.
18. Id § 6-3-702.
19. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The Blockburger test is recognized in Wyoming. State v. Keffer, 860
P.2d 1118, 1130 (Wyo. 1993).
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The issue arose pointedly in Owen v. State, 0 where Owen was charged
with and convicted of three offenses: second degree sexual assault in violation
of section 6-2-303; immodest, immoral or indecent liberties in violation of
section 14-3-105; and incest in violation of section 6-4-402. The evidence
showed a single act: Owen had put his finger into the vagina of his seven year
old daughter. The second degree sexual assault was based on the intrusion into
the child's vagina; the indecent liberties charge on the fact that Owen "had
pulled down his daughter's panties, [and] had touched her in the area of her
vagina"; and the incest on the blood relationship of father and daughter. Under
the Blockburger test, each crime required an element that the others did not,
making them separate offenses.
On appeal, Owen challenged the propriety of three convictions for a
single act. The Wyoming Supreme Court found that pulling down the panties
and touching the girl in the area of her vagina "were a part of, and necessary
to, the accomplishment of the second-degree sexual assault. The penetration
could not have been otherwise accomplished.', Therefore, the indecent
liberties conviction merged into the second-degree sexual assault conviction,
and Owen could not be sentenced for both. However, the incest charge was
found to be separate, in that it did not require intrusion-which second degree
sexual assault required--and had to involve a relative--which sexual assault
did not. Therefore, the Blockburger requirements were satisfied.
The Legislature seems to have given little consideration to whether
conduct which violates more than one statute can be used to convict and
punish for violation of all of the statutes violated. One approach would be that
of the Model Penal Code, which in section 1.07 limits the number of possible
convictions where the proscribed conduct was of the same nature, and which
in section 7.06(1) limits the sentence to that for the most serious crime
committed. Another approach would be to provide that a particular statute
applies only when another does not, as is done in third degree sexual assault by
excluding indecent liberties. 2 A third approach would be to examine the
defendant's acts functionally, to determine whether it is possible to commit
them independently of one another. This is the approach used by the Wyoming
Supreme Court in Owen v. State.
There is a measure of incongruity to the assumption that because a single
act offends against two statutes, each of which has an element which the other
does not, the Legislature intended that the offender by punished under both
statutes. In all likelihood, the Legislature intended nothing one way or the

20. 902 P.2d 190 (Wyo. 1995).
21. 902 P.2d at 195.
22. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-304(a).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol33/iss2/6

8

Lauer: The Wyoming Criminal Code Revisited: Reflections after Fifteen Ye
1998

WYOMING CRIMINAL CODE REVISITED

other, and to ascribe to it the desire to achieve a particular result based on the
vagaries of statutory language is irrational. A rational criminal code should be
based upon a clear and careful legislative consideration of liability for
offending against multiple statutes by a single act, and should contain
provisions making the legislative intent evident.
D. Lesser Included Offenses
When is one offense a lesser included offense within a greater offense, so
that a jury may convict the defendant of the lesser offense if it finds that the
greater offense has not been proved? Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure
31(c) provides that the "defendant may be found guilty of an offense
necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either
the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is
an offense." The question is how it is to be determined when an offense is
"necessarily included in the offense charged."
In State v. Keffer," decided in 1993, the Wyoming Supreme Court
addressed the problem of lesser included offenses in the context of whether the
crime of voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of second degree
murder. Functionally, the court seems to have seized upon a statutory elements
test redolent of the above quotation from Blockburger v. United States,"
requiring a comparison between the elements of the offense charged and the
elements of the lesser offense. If the elements of the lesser offense are a subset
of the elements of the greater-so that each element of the lesser is found
within the greater--then the lesser offense is truly a lesser included offense,
for which the defendant can be found guilty. In addition, there must be
evidence from which the jury could rationally determine that while the
defendant was not guilty of the greater offense, he was guilty of the lesser.
In Keffer, Justice Cardine put the matter succinctly in a concurring
opinion:
The trial judge must first determine if all the elements of the lesser
offense are found within the greater; and, if so, is there some evidence that would rationally permit the jury to find the accused
guilty of the lesser and not guilty of the greater offense. If such evidence is present, the instruction should be givenY

23. 860 P.2d 1118 (Wyo. 1993).

24. 284 U.S. 299,304 (1932). See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
25. 860 P.2d at 1140. Justice Cardine's test is not quite the same as the test which appears to be set

forth in Justice Thomas' lengthy majority opinion. Justice Cardine's test states that there must be "some
evidence that would rationally permit the jury to find the accused guilty of the lesser and not guilty of
the greater offense." This seems to require some evidence that the element constituting the greater of-
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While the test may seem simple enough, and be capable of almost
mechanical application, in practice it has proved more difficult. Thus in
Jackson v. State,2' the Wyoming Supreme Court held that second degree sexual
assault is not a lesser included offense of first degree sexual assault. In
Sindelar v. State,n the court held that reckless endangering is not a lesser
included offense of aggravated assault and battery, where the information
charged the defendant threatened to use a drawn deadly weapon.2 ' In both
cases, prosecutors and courts had assumed that the lesser offenses were in fact
lesser included offenses.
How can the rational criminal code avoid or eliminate confusion
regarding lesser included offenses? Where possible, greater and lesser offenses
should be drafted with their respective elements in mind, so that the lesser
offense is truly a lesser included offense.
E.

Criminal Intent

The Wyoming Criminal Code employs a number of terms to describe the
necessary culpable state of mind which a defendant must possess at the time he
acted. Thus "purposely," "intentionally," "voluntarily," "knowingly,"
"recklessly," "with criminal negligence," "believes," and "has reasonable
cause to believe" are all found in the Criminal Code. Only "criminal
negligence" and "recklessly" are defined

0

It is generally understood that there is a hierarchy of states of mind,
ranging downward in culpability from purposely or intentionally, through

fense does not exist. The majority opinion, on the other hand, embraces the "jury function theory,"
which allows the jury to weigh the evidence to determine whether the elements are present. The difference would appear in a case where larceny of property worth over $500 is charged, theft of property
valued at $500 or more being a felony, and property valued at less than $500 being a misdemeanor. The
only evidence regarding value is the testimony of the owner of the property that it was worth $550.
Under Justice Cardine's test, there is no evidence that would rationally permit the jury to find that the
property is worth less than $500, so no lesser included instruction on misdemeanor larceny would be
given. The jury is limited to convicting of felony larceny or acquitting. Under the jury function theory
embraced by the majority, on the other hand, the jury is free to believe or disbelieve the testimony of the
owner, and therefore could conclude that the property was worth less than $500. A lesser included instruction on misdemeanor larceny would be given, and the jury would have three choices: felony, misdemeanor or acquittal.
26. 891 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1995).
27. The court compared the elements of first degree sexual assault in WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2302(a)(i) and the elements of second degree sexual assault in section 6-2-303(a)(i) and (vi), and found
that the "elements of second degree sexual assault are not a subset of those found in first degree sexual
assault but rather contain separate elements." 891 P.2d at 73.
28. 932 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1997).
29. The court concluded that reckless endangering embodies the mental element of recklessness,
which is not present in the greater offense of aggravated assault and battery by threatening to use a
drawn deadly weapon on another. Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-504(a) with § 6-2-505(a)(iii). 932
P.2d at 733.
30. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-104(a)(iii) and (ix).
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knowingly, and down to recklessly and with criminal negligence. Perhaps the
best-known model is found in Model Penal Code section 2.02(2): purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, negligently. The question then arises whether the lesser
states of mind are necessarily included in the more culpable states. Thus, if a
defendant is charged with a crime which requires acting purposely, could a
lesser crime which requires that the defendant act negligently be a lesser
included offense?
The Model Penal Code solves this problem in section 2.02(5):
(5) Substitutes for Negligence, Recklessness and Knowledge.
When the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts
purposely, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to
establish an element, such element also is established if a person
acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to
establish an element, such element also is established if a person
acts purposely.
Under the Model Penal Code, the principle actually works two ways: If a
person is charged with acting with criminal negligence, proof that the person
acted purposely will suffice. Or if a defendant is charged with acting
purposely, the jury can find that he acted with criminal negligence in order to
convict him of a lesser included offense."
In Wyoming, it was long uncertain whether a lesser culpable state such as
recklessness or criminal negligence is included within the states of mind
imparting higher culpability, such as knowingly or purposely. However, in
Sindelar v. State, decided in 1997, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that an
'
intentional state of mind "does not encompass an element of 'recklessly.' '
Thus where the crime of aggravated assault and battery required that the
defendant intentionally threaten the victim, the crime of reckless endangering
which required a person to act recklessly could not be a lesser included
offense, because "recklessly" differs from and is not included within
"intentionally."
The result in Sindelar would seem to mean that involuntary
manslaughter, which requires that the defendant act recklessly," cannot be a
lesser included offense within that form of first degree murder which requires

31. This conclusion is supported both by the language of Model Penal Code § 2.02(5), and by the
Comment to Model Penal Code § 1.07(5). 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I,§§ 1.01
to 2.13, at 133-34 (1985).
32. 932 P.2d 730, 733 (Wyo. 1997).
33. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-105(a)(ii).
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that the defendant act purposely and with premeditated malice.14 In other
words, acting recklessly falls outside of acting purposely. On the other hand,
where first degree felony murder is charged, involuntary manslaughter or even
criminally negligent homicide may be proper lesser included offenses, since in
felony murder the state of mind resulting in death need not be purposeful. This
was the result in Harrisv. State," where the jury found Harris guilty of both
felony murder and criminally negligent homicide arising from a single death.
On appeal, Harris suggested that the crimes were mutually exclusive, so that
the jury could not consistently have found him guilty of both. The Wyoming
Supreme Court pointed out that any killing in the perpetration of one of the
listed felonies is a sufficient basis for conviction of felony murder-even if the
killing is negligent or accidental. Therefore, "[s]ince the same conduct may
violate both statutes, the crimes are not mutually exclusive."' ' Harrisdid not
mention the Sindelarcase.

Sindelar v. State may restrict sharply the number of crimes which can be
considered as lesser included offenses of other, greater crimes. The Legislature
can solve the problem by adopting a statute similar to Model Penal Code §
2.02(5), perhaps in combination with Model Penal Code § 1.07(5).
F.

Defenses

Wyoming Criminal Code section 6-1-102(b) provides: "Common-law
defenses are retained unless otherwise provided in this act." It is now difficult
to reconstruct whether the original impulse which ultimately brought about the
Criminal Code of 1982 included codifying criminal defenses, as had been done
in the Model Penal Code.,, While careful consideration was given to the
principal substantive crimes, it appears in retrospect that the legislative
committees simply ran out of time and energy regarding less serious crimes
and criminal defenses. Drafting an entire penal code is an exercise best
undertaken by emperors or great states, 3' and our own Legislature strove
valiantly and with some measure of success. But the criminal defenses
remained for the most part uncodified.
It is correct to say "for the most part uncodified," because the
Wyoming Legislature has historically undertaken to codify the defenses of

34. Id. § 6-1-201(a).
35. 933 P.2d 1114 (Wyo. 1997).
36. ld at 1120.
37. See in particular MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.08 - 2.13; 3.01 -3.11; 4.01 -4.10 (1985).

38. One thinks of Justinian and Napoleon, of New York and California. Yet influential codes have
also been crafted substantially by individuals, as with Edward Livingston's Louisiana Penal Code and
Thomas Babington Macaulay's Indian Penal Code. Jeremy Bentham was for a time in the penal code
drafting business, but I do not know how his codes fared.
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intoxication and of mental illness or deficiency." Other defenses are
recognized in various sections of the 1982 Criminal Code.,,
1. Battered Woman Syndrome.
It is unclear whether there is now a greater incidence of domestic abuse
than existed in the past. Domestic abuse reports have increased greatly in
recent years, and it is possible that the conditions of modem life, including the
near disappearance of the extended family, frequent marital discord, and the
pressures incident to a wage-earning society have produced more abuse. On
the other hand, some of the apparent increase in reports of abuse may be
attributable to lessened tolerance of physical violence, the development of
reporting mechanisms, and the growth of shelters and other support systems
which provide an alternative for battered spouses.
One apparently puzzling aspect of domestic violence is that persons who
suffer physical and mental abuse sometimes suddenly and without warning kill
their abusers. Thus the passive victim, who has been abused over a period of
time, will suddenly resort to violence against the abuser in a manner
inconsistent with the victim's prior patterns of conduct. Out of the need to
explain this conduct, the battered woman syndrome has evolved.
In 1981, in Buhrle v. State, Edith Buhrle was convicted of the second
degree murder of her estranged husband, Kenneth. The parties separated after
an argument in which Mr. Buhrle allegedly beat his wife. A week later, she
took a hunting rifle to the motel where he was staying, and after a protracted
argument through a partially open door, she shot and killed him. Mrs. Buhrle
sought to raise the defense that she suffered from the battered woman
syndrome, and called as an expert witness Dr. Lenore Walker, author of The
Battered Woman.!, Dr. Walker proposed to testify that Edith Buhrle was a
battered woman who suffered from a state of learned helplessness which made
her unable to walk away from a situation and caused her to perceive that she
39. Intoxication was recognized in 1869 Wyo. Ter. Sess. Laws ch. 3, tit. 1, § 9. The defense of
mental illness (or insanity as it was then known) was also codified in 1869 Wyo. Terr. Sess. Laws ch. 3,
§§ 5-6. The language of these sections is noteworthy:
Sec. 5. A lunatic or insane person without lucid intervals, shall not be found guilty of any
crime or misdemeanor, with which he may be charged; Provided, The act so charged as
criminal shall have been committed in the condition of insanity.
Sec. 6. An idiot shall not be found guilty, or punished for any crime or misdemeanor with
which he or she may be charged.
The sensitive modem mind may wonder at the choice of sexes: lunatics and insane persons are masculine, but idiots are of either gender.
40. Section 6-2-307 is notable: "The fact that the actor and victim are married to each other is not by
itself a defense" to a violation of most forms of first and second degree sexual assault WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-2-307 (Michie 1977 & Supp. 1983). The section proved short-lived; in Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 776
(Wyo. 1987), the Wyoming Supreme Court swept aside the marital defense.
41. LENORE E.WALKER, THE BATTERED WoMAN (1979).
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was in fear of her life and was acting in self-defense when she shot Kenneth
Buhrle. The trial court rejected Dr. Walker's testimony; the supreme court
affirmed on the ground that the battered woman syndrome was in its infancy,
and lacked a sufficiently established scientific basis.
Later, in Jahnke v. State,'4 where Richard Jahnke was charged with

murdering his father, the defense sought to raise a battered child defense to
explain the shooting as self-defense. The trial court excluded the evidence on
the ground that no adequate foundation had been laid for the testimony of the
expert. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.

In 1993, the Wyoming Legislature adopted section 6-1-203, which
recognized the battered woman syndrome as a subset of post-traumatic stress
disorder as defined by the American Psychiatric Association, and provided:
If a person is charged with a crime involving the use of force
against another, and the person raises the affirmative defense of
self-defense, the person may introduce expert testimony that the
person suffered from the syndrome, to establish the necessary requisite belief of an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm
as an element of the affirmative defense, to justify the person's use
of force.'"

The battered woman syndrome came before the Wyoming Supreme
Court in Wilt v. State," decided in 1995, where Dawn Rene Witt was convicted
of voluntary manslaughter in the killing of Mark Ayers, with whom she had
lived for two years. Witt claimed that she had shot the victim in self-defense,
and offered expert testimony that she suffered from the battered woman
syndrome. The trial court refused to permit the expert to testify as to Witt's
state of mind at the time she fired the fatal shot. The Wyoming Supreme Court
affirmed the manslaughter conviction, pointing out that section 6-1-203(b)
provides only that the expert may testify "that the person suffered from the
syndrome," and not what the defendant believed at the time she used force
against another. Moreover, the court concluded that testimony as to the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the violent act would not be helpful to

the jury.5

The supreme court made clear in the Witt case that the recognition of
battered woman syndrome in section 6-1-203 does not constitute a license for
battered women to kill: "WYO. STAT. § 6-1-203 does not create a separate

42.
43.
44.
45.

682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984).
1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 66, § 1.
892 P.2d 132 (Wyo. 1995).
892 P.2d at 138.
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defense; it permits the introduction of expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome when the affirmative defense of self-defense is raised." Thus, the
battered woman syndrome only permits expert testimony to explain the
reasonableness of the defendant's perception that he or she is in imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm in order tojustify the use of force in selfdefense.
It is unfortunate that the Legislature chose to characterize this aspect of
the post-traumatic stress disorder as the "battered woman syndrome." While
many persons who suffer from this mental condition are women, men and
children are also within the definition and are not meant to be excluded from
whatever benefits the statute might offer.
We can expect to see battered woman syndrome evidence offered
frequently by defendants in future Wyoming homicide and assault and battery
prosecutions. Many questions remain to be resolved regarding this evidence.
For instance, if the battered woman syndrome is a mental disorder, must the
defendant give notice under Rule 12.2 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal
Procedure of the intent to rely upon the syndrome as a defense?'
2.

Mental Illness or Deficiency.

Wyoming law regarding mental responsibility for criminal conduct has
remained substantially unchanged since 1983, when in response to John
Hinckley's acquittal because of mental illness following his attempt to assassinate President Reagan, the Wyoming Legislature amended sections 711-304 and 7-11-305 to require that mental illness be a "severely abnormal
mental condition" and that the defendant, not the State, has the burden of
proving mental illness or deficiency excluding responsibility. 7 The mental
illness and deficiency statute in its present form appears to be workable, and to
present no major difficulties which might require immediate correction.
Two developments in related areas have occurred since 1983. In Dean v.
State," the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the defense of diminished or
partial responsibility, which would apply where the defendant was found
mentally responsible for his acts, but suffering from diminished mental

46. Another very real problem isthat section 6-1-203(a) refers to the "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder established in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders HI-Revised of the American Psychiatric Association." DSM 111-1i,as the manual is known, was published in 1987. In 1994, the
American Psychiatric Association published the fourth edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, known as DSM-IV. The criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in DSM-IV are
different from those in DSM-III-R. Itseems anachronistic to require experts to testify according to the
outdated DSM-III-R criteria when these are no longer the accepted standards of the profession.
47. 1983 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 179, § 1.
48. 668 P.2d 639 (Wyo. 1983).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1998

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 33 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 6
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXIII

capacity so that he could not formulate willfulness and malice, or some
specific intent. The court concluded that the Legislature had codified the law
of mental responsibility, and that "[i]f the legislature had intended additional
defenses, it would have said so."
In 1984, in Polston v. State," the supreme court applied the defense of
traumatic automatism or unconsciousness, where the defendant claims not to
be criminally responsible for acts committed while in a state of
unconsciousness. The court made clear that automatism or unconsciousness is
not a mental illness or deficiency, but results from a brain injury which
produces a state of unconsciousness in which the person is not able to control
his actions.' Further, the defense "is not available if the unconscious condition
results primarily from voluntary intoxication."'" Polston gave rise to Rule 12.3
of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that if the
defendant intends to assert a defense of unconsciousness, notice must be given
to the State, whereupon the defendant will be examined by an examiner
designated by the court.
3.

Intoxication.

Consumption of alcohol affects the mind, which explains why large
quantities are consumed. When a person consumes a substantial amount,
perceptions may be dimmed and inhibitions released. We say that the person is
"under the influence of alcohol," meaning that he is acting differently from
how he acts when sober. Many acts of a criminal nature are committed when
the actor has consumed alcohol and arguably is affected thereby." The
criminal justice system has long experienced uncertainty as to how to deal
with offenders who were under the influence of alcohol at the time of their
acts. Whether to permit a defense of intoxication has proved troublesome.
Several alternatives have been suggested, and some of them adopted at various
times and places. First, it would be possible to punish the actor more severely
for criminal acts committed while intoxicated, increasing the penalty because
the actor allowed himself to become intoxicated. Next, the fact of intoxication
could simply be disregarded, insofar as it might have affected the actor's
mental state.' A third approach would allow the actor to avoid criminal
49. 685 P.2d I (Wyo. 1984). Earlier, in Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142 (Wyo. 1981), the supreme
court had recognized that the defense of unconsciousness may be asserted in Wyoming, but concluded
that it had not been properly raised by the defendant.
50. Polston,685 P.2d at 6.
51. Id at9.
52. "'There rarely could be a conviction for homicide if drunkenness avoided responsibility." I
FRANCIS WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 49, at 79 (8th ed. 1880)
53. This was the classical common law treatment of intoxication. 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 32 (1736): "[B]y the laws of England such a person shall have no privilege
by this voluntmy contracted madness, but shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right
senses." Glanville Williams has asked, "If a man is punished for doing something when drunk that he
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liability where the crime required a specific intent, and the intoxication was
sufficient to render him unable to formulate that intent." Finally, intoxication
could be recognized as a defense to all crimes, where it so affected the actor's
mind as to negate the mental state required for the crime."
Wyoming has followed the majority of American states in providing that
intoxication can be a defense where it negates a specific intent which is an
element of the crime. Section 6-1-202 provides that self-induced intoxication
"is not a defense to a criminal charge except to the extent that in any
prosecution evidence of self-induced intoxication may be offered when it is
relevant to negate the existence of a specific intent which is an element of the
crime." 16 Thus self-induced intoxication can provide a defense only where a
specific intent crime is charged. First, it is necessary to know what is a specific
intent crime. Generally, where the statute defining a crime requires that an act
be performed with the ultimate purpose of achieving some further goal, that
statute creates a specific intent crime. This has been called an "ulterior intent."
The statutes defining such crimes normally require that an act be performed
"with intent to" bring about some further consequence, such as burglary:
entering or remaining in a building without authority, "with intent to commit
larceny or a felony therein.",7 First degree premeditated malice murder is also a
specific intent crime, because it requires proof that the defendant intended to
kill the victim, even though the words "with intent to" are not present in the
statute.5'
Wyoming has experienced little difficulty with the application of the
intoxication defense. While it requires no evidence beyond the defendant's
own testimony to take the issue of intoxication to the jury,'' Wyoming juries
by and large have been reluctant to excuse criminal conduct because of the
defendant's consumption of alcohol.10

would not have done when sober, is he not in plain truth punished for getting drunk?" CRIMINAL LAW:
THE GENERAL PART § 181 at 564 (2d ed. 1961). Williams' objection is too simplistic, and can apply
only when alcohol can be said to be the sole cause of the criminal conduct. But alcohol alone cannot
commit crimes; criminal conduct must result from some directed human activity. The conduct remains
that of the actor, even if he is affected to some degree by the fact of intoxication.
54. This is the approach followed by most jurisdictions at the present time, including Wyoming. See
infra note 56 and accompanying text.
55. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(1) (1985): "intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense." This blanket application of intoxication is somewhat fudged in section
2.08(2): "When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced
intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial."
56. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-202 (Michie 1997).
57. Id. § 6-3-301(a).
58. Id. § 6-2-101(a).
59. Goodman v. State, 573 P.2d 400,410-12 (Wyo. 1977).
60. See, e.g., Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1992); Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91 (Wyo. 1988).
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It is difficult to support the limitation of the intoxication defense to
specific intent crimes, excluding its application to all crimes of general intent.
On the other hand, it may be as difficult to support having a voluntary
intoxication defense in any form. The defense seems to provide the jury with
an opportunity to acquit an otherwise guilty defendant on the basis of
sympathy for the defendant.
The troublesome nature of the intoxication defense, making it possible for
a person to become voluntarily intoxicated and commit acts of a criminal
nature, and then to use the fact of intoxication to escape full responsibility for
those criminal acts, has led to proposals to abolish the defense altogether.
While abolition of the intoxication defense has been described by legal
scholars as "clearly wrong,"', some states have abolished the defense either by
judicial decision" or by statute.3
In 1987, Montana adopted a statute providing that voluntary intoxication
"may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental
state which is an element of the offense.", In State v. Egelhoff," a prosecution
for deliberate homicide, the Montana Supreme Court held the statute
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution as a violation of due
process, concluding that evidence of intoxication was relevant to whether the
defendant acted knowingly and purposely and exclusion of such evidence
diminished the state's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorariand reversed." Four justices
concluded that the intoxication defense is not a "fundamental principle of
justice," so that the Due Process Clause did not prevent Montana from
abolishing the defense.7 Justice Ginsburg concurred on the ground that
Montana was free to redefine mens rea so as to exclude consideration of
intoxication." Four justices dissented on the ground that mental state is an
essential element of the crime of deliberate homicide, and the adoption of what
the dissenters classified as an "evidentiary rule" excluding consideration of
intoxication denied due process.6

61. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTt, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 4.10(a) at 554
(1986).
62. See, e.g., State v. Stasio, 396 A.2d 1129 (N.J. 1979); State v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328 (S.C.
1977).
63. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-503 (Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE, tit. 11, § 421 (1995); GA.
§ 16-3-4 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-230 (1994); TExAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04

CODE ANN.
(1994).
64.
65.
66.
67.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1997).
900 P.2d 260 (Mont. 1995).
Montanav. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
Id. at2016-24.

68. Id. at 2024-26.
69. Id. at 2026-35.
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Abolition of the defense of intoxication is a rational solution to the
problem posed by persons who commit crimes under the lessened inhibitions
incidental to voluntary intoxication, then seek to excuse their criminal conduct
on the ground that the "influence of alcohol" and not their personal culpability
caused that conduct. Consumption of alcohol, while socially sanctioned and
productive of gratification, is an activity fraught with danger to others; persons
who choose to drink must be held fully accountable for the results of their
conduct while in the pleasurable state known as intoxication.
IV. INCHOATE OFFENSES

Prior to 1981, Wyoming had no general statute punishing criminal
attempts or criminal solicitation. A statute punishing conspiracy to kidnap had
been enacted in 1935,' and a statute covering any conspiracy to commit a
felony was adopted in 1969." In 1981, the Legislature enacted general statutes
on criminal attempts, solicitation to commit felonies, and conspiracy,'
incorporating the language of the Model Penal Code." The punishment for
attempt, solicitation and conspiracy was the same as for the most serious crime
attempted, solicited or conspired to commit.'" The provisions for attempt,
solicitation and conspiracy were incorporated into the Wyoming Criminal
Code of 1982, and have not been amended since 1983.
A.

ProsecutorsDiscover Inchoate Offenses

Attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are called "inchoate" or
"preparatory" offenses because they consist of steps toward the commission of
a substantive offense. These inchoate crimes may be committed even if no
substantive offense is actually committed. In fact, if the attempted crime is
committed, the attempt merges into the consummated offense; and if the crime
solicited is attempted or committed, the crime of solicitation ceases to exist.71
While a person can be convicted and punished both for conspiracy to commit a
crime and for the commission of that crime, the crime of conspiracy does not
require anything more than agreement and an overt act to effect the objective

70. 1935 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 85, §2.
71. 1969 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 164, § 1. In 1971, the Wyoming Legislature adopted a comprehensive
controlled substances statute, including a section punishing attempts and conspiracies to violate the
controlled substances law. 1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 246, § 42. This section, now codified as Wyo.

STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1042 (Michie 1997), differs from the general conspiracy section in that it does not
require an overt act in addition to the agreement to violate the law. The punishment for such attempts
and conspiracies "may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense." Id.
72. 1981 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 11, § 1.Attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are now found in WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6-1-301 to -303.
73. MODEL PENAL CODE §§5.01, 5.03, 5.03 (1985).

74. 1981 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 11, § 1,now codified as WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304. This section
was drawn from MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05.
75. WYO.STAT. ANN. § 6-1-302(a).
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of the agreement.7
But although no substantive crime need be committed, and no actual
harm need be caused to any victim, the Criminal Code provides that attempt,
solicitation and conspiracy can be punished as severely as if the object crime
had in fact been committed.n
Prosecutors have put the inchoate offenses and their severe punishments
to intense use. Where once a person who shot at or severely beat another
would have been prosecuted for some form of aggravated assault and battery,
today the person is likely to be charged with attempted murder. Thus, prior to
1981, a person who shot and wounded another, intending to kill, was subject to
a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 14 years, whether classified as assault
and battery with felonious intent" or as aggravated assault and battery with a
dangerous weapon." Under the present law, the person would be charged with
attempted first degree murder, and would receive a mandatory life sentence if
convicted.Y
Similarly, whenever two persons act in concert to commit a crime, the
likelihood is that they have agreed in advance to do so'--making them
conspirators and subject to punishment not only for the commission of the
crime, but to an added equal punishment for conspiracyY
The Model Penal Code, from which Wyoming's inchoate offense statutes
are derived, provides a measure of amelioration. First, an attempt, solicitation
or conspiracy to commit a felony of the first degree, such as murder, is not
itself a felony of the first degree--as would be the case in Wyoming-but a
felony of the second degree, bearing a maximum sentence of ten years.0
Second, where both a conspiracy and the object crime of the conspiracy are
76. Id § 6-1-303(a).
77. The only exception is that "an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit a capital crime is not
punishable by the death penalty if the capital crime is not committed." WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304.
Interestingly, this leaves open the possibility that one who conspires to commit first degree murder is
subject to the death penalty for the conspiracy if the murder is committed.
78. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-69 (Michie 1957).
79. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-70.B (Michie 1957 & Supp. 1975).
80. See, e.g., Geiger v. State, 859 P.2d 665 (Wyo. 1993), where Mary Geiger quarreled with Ernest
Romero, then went home and returned with a gun, intending to "hurt" Romero, then followed him home
and shot him three times. Mary Geiger's conviction of attempted first degree murder, with its attendant
life sentence, was affirmed.
81. See Rands v. State, 818 P.2d 44 (Wyo. 1991), where Rands drove his car up behind and then
beside another vehicle, and a passenger in Rands' car then fired a shot into the other vehicle, wounding
one of the occupants. Rands was convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and his conviction was affirmed against the claim that the evidence was insufficient Rands did not help his cause by
admitting to a police officer that he may have said to his passenger, "Blow that motherftzcker's head
off."
82. See, e.g.,
Bigelow v. State, 768 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1989).
83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1985).
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charged, the person cannot be convicted of more than one offense if "one
offense consists only of a conspiracy or other form of preparation to commit
the other.""
The underlying question is what punishment is appropriate for inchoate
offenses, and whether Wyoming's scheme of imposing the same punishment
for attempt, solicitation or conspiracy as could be imposed for the object crime
is too severe. In most cases, when sentencing for an inchoate offense the court
has discretion to choose a sentence from a possible range of years. Thus, for
conspiracy to commit burglary, the trial court has a sentencing range of one to
ten years." But for conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the trial court is
required to sentence the defendant to life in prison." While in some cases, a
life sentence is appropriate for conspiring to commit first degree murder, in
other cases such punishment is plainly excessive."
B. Attempt
Wyoming's attempt statute provides that a person is guilty of attempt to
commit a crime if "[w]ith the intent to commit the crime, he does any act
which is a substantial step toward commission of the crime."" The attempt
statute contains an unusual amelioratory provision, that a person is not liable
for attempt "if, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete
renunciation of his criminal intention, he avoided the commission of the crime
attempted by abandoning his criminal effort."" In other words, if after the
84. Id. § 1.07(l)(b). In addition, a person cannot be convicted of more than one inchoate offense "for
conduct designed to commit or culminate in the commission of the same crime." Id § 5.05(3). Thus, one
could not be convicted under the Model Penal Code of attempt and conspiracy, or solicitation and conspiracy.
85. Burglary is punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3101(b) (Michie 1997). And the court may grant probation following a conviction of burglary--or a
conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary. See, e.g., id § 7-13-302, permitting the trial court to place
a person on probation following conviction "for any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life
imprisonment" Id
86. The punishment for first degree murder is either death or life imprisonment WYO. STAT. ANN. §
6-2-102(b). A person convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder "is not punishable by the
death penalty if the capital crime is not committed," id. § 6.1-304, leaving life imprisonment as the only
possible penalty for conspiring to commit first degree murder where the murder is not committed. And a
person convicted of a crime punishable by life in prison cannot be given probation. Id § 7-13-302.
87. Thus, where there is agreement to kill, together with a necessary overt act, but the killing is not
attempted or completed, a life sentence may be excessive. A life sentence could be excessive even where
the killing is attempted. Consider such cases as Rands v. State, 818 P.2d 44 (Wyo. 1991) (Rands was
driver of car from which shot was fired); and Jones v. State, 777 P.2d 54 (Wyo. 1989) (Knox arranged
the planned killing; Jones directed Young to the victim's house, where Young shot but did not kill the
victim; Knox and Jones were both convicted of conspiracy and sentenced to life in prison).
88. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-301(a)(i). The statute further provides that a substantial step "is conduct
which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to complete the commission of
the crime." Id. Alternatively, attempt may be committed when a person "intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime had the attendant circumstances been as the person believes them
to be." Id. § 6-1-301(a)(ii).
89. Id § 6-1-303(b).
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person attempts to commit the crime he voluntarily abandons his criminal
effort and does not commit the crime, he cannot be found guilty of attempt.
Understandably, the Wyoming Supreme Court has experienced difficulty
in applying the renunciation provision so as to absolve the defendant of all
criminal responsibility. In Haight v. State, 1Haight used physical force in an
effort to compel the victim to submit to sexual intrusion. The victim resisted,
and Haight made no further efforts. Appealing his conviction for attempted
sexual assault, Haight argued that he had abandoned his attempt within the
meaning of the statute. The State argued that since Haight had already
committed the crime of attempted sexual assault before he desisted, there
could be no subsequent renunciation. The supreme court pointed out that the
attempt statute indeed provided that voluntary and complete renunciation did
prevent conviction for an attempt already committed. "The statutes are not
analytically sound, but legislatures apparently feel that the illogical result is
justified because it encourages people to forego criminal activity."" The court
concluded, however, that Haight did not voluntarily and completely renounce
his criminal intention, but instead ceased his attempt because of the victim's
resistance. Therefore, the renunciation provision did not apply.'2
The abandonment issue arose again in Ramirez v. State," where Alonzo
Ramirez was convicted of attempted second degree murder when he stabbed
Parn Blesi nine times with an ice pick. The evidence showed that after he
stabbed her, Ramirez called an ambulance, which took her to the hospital. On
appeal, Ramirez argued that he could not be convicted of attempting to kill
Pam Blesi because after stabbing her but before killing her, he stopped his
attack and called the ambulance. Therefore, he had voluntarily and completely
renounced his criminal intention to kill, and abandoned his criminal effort. The
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed Ramirez' conviction. It acknowledged that
under the statute renunciation may occur "even after the defendant has taken a
substantial step toward commission of the crime. . . .There comes a point,
however, when abandonment is no longer possible. In a murder attempt, this

90. 654 P.2d 1232 (Wyo. 1982).
91. Id. at 1241-42.
92. The Wyoming Supreme Court, in deciding whether Haight's renunciation was voluntary and
complete, referred approvingly to the Colorado attempt statute, which set forth circumstances governing
renunciation. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-401 (1978 Repl.). In its 1983 session, the Wyoming Legislature
amended section 6-1-311(b) by adding two sentences substantially similar to the Colorado provision:
Within the meaning of this subsection, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it
is motivated, in whole or in pan, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of
the person's course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or
which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal intention. Renunciation is not
complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.
1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171, § I.
93. 739 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1987).
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point is clearly reached once the actor has injured his victim.""
Abandonment was again asserted in Apodaca v. State,91 a conviction for
attempted first degree sexual assault. The evidence showed that on Christmas
Eve, Apodaca went to the home of AM, an elderly woman neighbor, and told
her "I am going to have you." He threw AM onto the bed. "AM resisted the
attack as soon as it started. Her resistance culminated when AM kneed
Apodaca between the legs and hit him in the face as he attempted to unbuckle

his pants. At that point, Apodaca stopped his aggression."' Affirming the
conviction, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that Apodaca had not
voluntarily and completely renounced his criminal intention. Instead, he only
desisted after the victim resisted, supporting "the inference that AM's
resistance made completion of the crime more difficult than Apodaca had
anticipated.""7
Harrisv. State" was an appeal from a conviction of felony murder, where
the predicate felony was either attempted first degree sexual assault or
attempted second degree sexual assault. Harris argued that he had renounced
his attempt when, after the victim resisted his efforts to have sex with her, he
struck her and broke her nose, and then shoved her out of the door of his
pickup truck and onto the roadway. Her naked body was found the next day
near the road, where she had died from hypothermia. The Wyoming Supreme
Court affirmed the felony murder conviction, citing Haight v. State for the
proposition that the victim's resistance made consummation of the crime more
difficult, and thereby precluded voluntary renunciation, and Ramirez v. State
for the proposition that renunciation is no longer possible after the actor has
injured the victim."
Has the renunciation provision been rendered a nullity, or are there
circumstances in which after a criminal attempt has been made, the actor can
abandon his attempt to commit the crime and escape liability? Certainly in

94. Id. at 1216. The opinion explained further:
[O]nce a defendant has completed his criminal effort, it is too late for abandonment. Appellant's attempt to commit the crime of second degree murder was complete under the circum-

stances of this case when he stabbed his victim with the ice pick. That he stabbed her eight
more times leaves little doubt but that he had attempted to kill her. If calling an ambulance
saved her life, it also saved appellant from being convicted of the crime of murder and perhaps a more severe sentence. But, with respect to the attempt, that crime was complete, as he

had passed beyond the point at which abandonment was legally possible.
Id. at 1217.
The Ramirez decision was criticized in a note in 24 LAND & WATER L. REv. 219 (1989), which con-

cluded that the decision had effectively rendered the abandonment provision a nullity,
95. 796 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1990).

96.
97.
98.
99.

ld. at 807.
Id. at 808.
933 P.2d 1114 (Wyo. 1997).
Id. at1123-24.
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cases where the actor has gone so far as to injure the intended victim,
renunciation is no longer possible. Nor is renunciation possible where there is
victim resistance or other circumstances which make commission of the
intended crime more difficult. But where the substantial step towards
commission of the crime has not resulted in contact with or injury to the
victim, there still may be a place for voluntary abandonment. Thus, if the actor,
intending to kill the victim, armed himself with a gun and went to the victim's
house and rang the doorbell, expecting the intended victim to appear, it could
be argued that a substantial step had been taken, and an attempt to kill had
been made. If after ringing the doorbell the actor changed his mind and fled
before anyone answered, it could be found that renunciation had taken place.
But what if the actor did more, something short of injuring the victim, short of
the point of no return as adopted in Ramirez? What if the actor shot at the
victim and missed, and then changed his mind about killing and fired no more
shots? If encouraging persons to forgo criminal activity is the guiding
principle, then if the actor can be induced to stop without firing more shots, he
should be encouraged to do so by allowing renunciation. However, it is
unclear whether the Wyoming Supreme Court would accept this.
C.

Conspiracy
The Wyoming conspiracy statute provides in section 6-1-303(a):
A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with
one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will
commit a crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement.'1'

It has long been a truism that it takes more than one person to conspire,
and that one cannot conspire with an undercover government agent who does
not intend that the object crime be committed.
However, the Model Penal Code, from which the Wyoming conspiracy
statute is drawn, departed from the concept of the bilateral or multilateral
conspiracy, and introduced the notion of a unilateral conspiracy under which
"the actor's liability is measured from the situation as he views it, i.e., it is not
a defense that the other party did not have the requisite purpose. It is sufficient,
in other words, for the actor to believe that he is agreeing with another for the
requisite criminal objective."'"' The important thing is that the actor is
unequivocally shown to have "a firm purpose to commit a crime."

100. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-303(a) (Michie 1997).
101. 2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part 1, § 5.03 at 394 (1985). See also Id. at 398402.
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Because of the traditional understanding that conspiracy required two or
more full participants, there was serious question whether the Wyoming
Supreme Court would accept the Model Penal Code's doctrine of unilateral
conspiracy. In Miller v. State,"0 Miller, a prisoner in the penitentiary, began
discussions with fellow inmate Ingersoll and by phone with Steven Powell,
who was in Sheridan, regarding escaping from prison and kidnapping Miller's
former wife. At some point, Powell notified the Wyoming Division of
Criminal Investigation, which encouraged further discussion of the plot.
Miller, Ingersoll and Powell then agreed to cooperate in the scheme and Miller
sent Powell a floor plan of his former wife's house. At trial, the jury was
instructed that "there can be no criminal conspiracy involving only the
Defendant and a government agent or informer."10' Miller was convicted. On
appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court observed:
At the federal level, most circuits have adopted the rule that a conspiracy cannot be formed with a government agent. United States v.
Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1422 (10th Cir. 1985). Wyoming has not
considered the question; however, instruction # 9 which instructed
there could be no conspiracy with a government agent became the
law of the case. 10
The supreme court reversed Miller's conspiracy conviction because the jury
instructions were incomplete and confusing and because of error in voir dire.
In Miller's retrial, the district court instructed the jury on the unilateral
theory of conspiracy, and Miller was again convicted of conspiring to kidnap
his former wife. Miller again appealed, arguing that the bilateral theory which
became the law of the case at the first trial was binding upon the district court
in the second trial, and that in any event it was error to instruct on unilateral
conspiracy. The supreme court affirmed, holding that when a case is reversed
and remanded for retrial, the trial court in the new trial is "not inhibited by
rulings made during the first trial, and [is] free to try the case as though it had
not previously been tried."' The court then held that the language of
Wyoming's conspiracy statute is consistent with the unilateral theory of
conspiracy. "It is our conclusion that we should follow the majority of our
sister states, and we hold that valid public policy as well as the language and
the legislative history of our conspiracy statute make the unilateral approach to
conspiracy the law of Wyoming."'''

102.
103.
104.
105.

904 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1995).
Id. at 349.
Id. at 349-50.
Miller v. State, No. 96-89, 1998 WL 136168, at * 4 (Wyo. March 27, 1998).

106. Id. at *6.
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HOMICIDE

Murder in the FirstDegree

First degree murder under Wyoming Statute section 6-2-101(a) can be
committed in two ways: by killing purposely and with premeditated malice, or
by killing in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, certain designated
crines.ln Traditionally, those crimes were felonies which involved particular
danger to others: rape, arson, robbery or burglary.102 Thus, murder of this kind
was commonly called felony murder. It is not necessary that the defendant
intend to kill the victim in felony murder; it is enough that the death is caused
in the commission of or attempt to commit the listed felony.' Wyoming's
present list of crimes in the perpetration of which a killing becomes first
degree murder includes both felonies and misdemeanors: sexual assault, arson,
robbery, burglary, escape, resisting arrest, kidnapping or abuse of a child under
the age of sixteen years."0
In 1994, the Legislature added the predicate crime of abuse of a child
under the age of sixteen years."' The addition of child abuse follows a national2
trend to impose more severe penalties for child abuse resulting in death."
Making child abuse resulting in death first degree murder has two flaws, one
conceptual and the other based on the structure of the Wyoming child abuse
statute.
Conceptually, the predicate crime or felony for felony murder has not
traditionally been a crime of assault and battery. The reason for this is that an
assault and battery which results in death is first degree murder only if the
actor intended to kill the victim, e.g., did so purposely and with premeditated
malice. An assault and battery which is not intended to kill, but results in
death, is homicide, but of a lesser degree than first degree murder. To make
assault and battery a predicate crime for felony murder would destroy the
structure of the homicide crimes, whereby an unintended killing resulting from
an intentional assault has been treated as second degree murder or
manslaughter. Much child abuse is of an assaultive nature. If such child abuse
107. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(a) (Michie 1997).
108. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (Michie 1957).
109. Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114,1124-25 (Wyo. 1997).

110. The misdemeanors are fourth degree arson under WYo. STAT. ANN. § 63o104 (Michie 1997),
which is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year and fine of $750, and resisting arrest
under section 6-5-204(a), which is punishable by imprisonment for one year and fine of $1,000.
111. 1994 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 22.

112. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1135 (1998), involving a Louisiana statute defining
first degree murder as including a killing "When the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great
bodily harm upon a victim under the age of twelve." The specific holding of Lewis was that the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994), does not make the Louisiana statute applicable on an army
base, since the death of the child was punishable under the federal second degree murder statute.
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is undertaken with premeditated intent to kill, then first degree murder is
appropriate. But if it is not so undertaken, so that the death of the child is an
unintended result, conviction for first degree murder may be inappropriate and
excessive. There is a parallel between assaultive child abuse which results in
unintended death, and assault and battery which results in unintended death.
An unintended death resulting from either should not be elevated to first
degree murder. 3 Elevating all child abuse resulting in death to first degree
murder, to the exclusion of possible guilt of second degree murder or
manslaughter, distorts the structure of homicide.
The second problem lies in the definition of the crime of child abuse in
the Criminal Code section 6-2-503(a):
Except under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2502, a person is guilty of child abuse, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, if:
(i) The actor is an adult or is at least six (6) years older
than the victim; and
(ii) The actor intentionally or recklessly inflicts upon a
child under the age of sixteen (16) years:
(A) Physical injury as defined in W.S. 14-3202(a)(ii)(B); or
(B) Mental injury as defined in W.S. 14-3202(a)(ii)(A).
Thus, where the circumstances constitute a violation of section 6-2-502,
the resulting offense cannot be child abuse. Section 6-2-502 defines the crime
of aggravated assault and battery, and includes causing serious bodily injury
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life, and also includes intentionally
causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon.
Consequently, the most severe forms of assaultive injury to children
inflicted without intent to kill cannot be classified as child abuse, but fall under
aggravated assault and battery. Where there is an aggravated assault and
battery without purpose to kill, but death results, the crime is not first degree
murder, but second degree murder or manslaughter. On the other hand, where

113. At this point, a distinction must be made between death resulting from an assault and battery, and
killing which occurs in the perpetration of felonies such as arson, robbery and sexual assault. The latter
killing falls within traditional felony murder; the first does not.
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there is the less severe assaultive child abuse without intent to kill, but death
results, the crime will be first degree murder. The consequences can be bizarre.
Aggravated assault and battery resulting in death occurs where a person
assaults a child with a deadly weapon, without intent to kill, but the child dies.
The crime is punishable as second degree murder or manslaughter. But if a
person slaps a child, without intent to kill or even to harm, and the child suffers
physical injury and dies, the result will be first degree murder.
A second problem is that the definition of "physical injury" in Wyoming
Statute section 14-3-202(aXii)(B), as incorporated in the child abuse statute,
section 6-2-503, includes "death." If the death of the child is used as the basis
for making the act child abuse, is it proper to use the death a second time to
elevate the crime to first' degree murder? Has the formulation become:
intentionally or recklessly causing the death of a child resulting in death of a
child is first degree murder?"4
Third, given the broad definition of child abuse in section 6-2-503, does it
encompass physical injury to a child resulting from reckless operation of a
motor vehicle? If a person recklessly operates a vehicle and causes the death of
another person, the resulting crime is aggravated vehicular manslaughter under
section 6-2-106(b)," with a maximum punishment of 20 years. But if reckless
injury to a child is child abuse, and death of a child results from the reckless
operation of a motor vehicle, can first degree murder now be charged?
One serious and perhaps unintended consequence of the amendment to
section 6-2-101(a) incorporating death in the perpetration of child abuse as
first degree murder is that many injuries to children can be characterized as
child abuse, and death from all such injuries is now first degree murder.
Doubtless when the Legislature amended section 6-2-101(a) to include
child abuse, the legislators envisioned that the statute would apply to instances
of intentional physical abuse of children where the intent to kill the child or do
serious bodily harm to the child was present. But sadly the amendment applies
to much more. It seems to have been enacted without much thought or
analysis; after all, how could anyone oppose an act punishing child abuse? It is
not too late to reexamine this amendment, and to make appropriate changes to
the relevant statutes.

114. Consider the case where the parent leaves the very young child unattended in the bathtub while
the parent answers the telephone and engages in a long conversation with a friend. The child drowns.
The only physical injury suffered by the child is its death. Therefore, the fact of death is a necessary
element in the crime of child abuse. Can the child's death be used a second time to enhance the child
abuse to first degree murder? Or would we not say that there is no death in the perpetration of child
abuse when the child abuse itself is based on the child's death?
115. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-106(b) (Michie 1997).
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Murder in the Second Degree

Murder in the second degree is defi'ed in section 6-2-104: "Whoever
purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being,
is guilty of murder in the second degree .... -,6 Murder in the second degree is
to be contrasted with murder in the first degree, which requires that the killing
be "purposely and with premeditated malice." 1"
The difference between first and second degree murder, then, appears to
be the absence of premeditation in second degree murder. At least a literal
reading of the statutes would seem to lead to this conclusion. Since first degree
murder requires that the actor intend to kill the victim-in other words, first
degree murder is intent-to-kill murder requiring the specific intent to kill"-it
would thus follow that second degree murder also requires that the actor intend
to kill the victim. This construction would make second degree murder a
specific intent crime as well: an act of violence done toward another person
with the intent to kill that person.
In Crozier v. State,"' decided in 1986, the Wyoming Supreme Court held
that second degree murder is not a specific intent crime, and therefore is not
simply first degree murder without premeditation. Crozier may be an example
of the adage that hard cases make bad law. Crozier was convicted of second
degree murder for killing a six year old child he was babysitting, by strangling
the child. On appeal, Crozier argued that the trial court should have instructed
the jury on the defense of intoxication, since second degree murder was a
specific intent crime and there was evidence that Crozier was intoxicated at the
time of the killing.'- The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed Crozier's
conviction, holding that second degree murder is not a specific intent crime
and therefore intoxication is not a defense to second degree murder. Neither
the word "maliciously" nor "purposely" embodies the intent to kill.'2 '
The holding in Crozier is that second degree murder is a general intent
116. Id. § 6-2-104. Murder in the second degree has remained nearly unchanged since 1869, when the
First Territorial Legislature provided in ch. 3, tit I1l, § 16: "Any person who shall purposely and maliciously, but without deliberation and premeditation, kill another, such person shall be deemed guilty of
murder in the second degree, and on conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary, or territorial prison, and kept at hard labor during life."
117. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(a). In addition to killings committed purposely and with premeditated malice, first degree murder includes killings in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate sexual
assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting arrest, kidnapping or abuse of a child under the age of
16.
118. See. e.g.. Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 493 (Wyo. 1992).
119. 723 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 1986).
120. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-202(a) provides that self-induced intoxication is a defense only to
specific intent crimes, and "evidence of self-induced intoxication of the defendant may be offered when
it is relevant to negate the existence of a specific intent which is an element of the crime." Id.
121. Crozier, 723 P.2d at 51-56.
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crime, which does not require that the defendant intended to kill the victim, but
only that the defendant intended to perform the act which caused the victim's
death. As the supreme court stated in a later decision, "second degree murder
is a general intent crime, requiring only proof of the element of
voluntariness."' "
Therefore, unless "purposely" or "maliciously" are deemed to have
radically different meanings when used in the first and second degree murder
statutes, the intent-to-kill distinction between first and second degree murder
must be found in the word "premeditated." The supreme court agreed with this
in Bouwkamp v. State: "We conclude premeditation is the specific intent
element which distinguishes the two types of murder."''1
The result is that any act done maliciously and willfully which causes the
death of another person is second degree murder. Thus, striking or shoving
another intentionally and with malice but without intent to kill, will be second
degree murder if the victim dies from the consequences of the blow or shove.
What is the crime if, without premeditation but on the spur of the
moment, the actor strikes or shoots the victim, intending to kill him, and the
victim dies as the result? The absence of premeditation means that this cannot
be first degree murder. Does the presence of intent to kill mean that the death
cannot be second degree murder? Hardly. While the intent to kill is not a
necessary element of second degree murder, its presence does not prevent the
killing from being second degree murder. All the elements of second degree
murder are present: a purposeful and malicious act and resulting death.
The question remains whether after Crozier there can be attempted
second degree murder. The crime of attempt is itself a specific intent crime:
"With intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step
towards commission of the crime.114 As second degree murder requires that
the victim die as the result of the purposeful and malicious act, to attempt
second degree murder it must be intended that the victim die. But intent to kill
is not a required element of second degree murder. Therefore, it can be argued
that there can be no attempted second degree murder, since the fact of the
death is fortuitous rather than intended.
However, as pointed out above, the existence of intent to kill does not
122. 833 P.2d 486,493 (Wyo. 1992).
123. Id. But it must be kept in mind that there can be intent to kill without premeditation, unless
premeditation is to be given a radically different meaning from its traditional definition. "The word
'premeditated' when used in reference to first-degree murder, implies an interval, however brief, between the formation of the intent or design and the commission of the act." Collins v. State, 589 P.2d
1283, 1292 (Wyo. 1979).
124. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-301(a).
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mean that an act which results in death cannot be second degree murder.
Where an act is done purposely and maliciously, intending to kill, but without
premeditation, and death results, the crime is second degree murder; and where
the actor, intending to kill, and acting purposely and with malice but without
premeditation, does an act which is a substantial step toward the intended
killing, a punishable attempt to commit second degree murder arises. On the
other hand, where without intending to kill, the actor attempts but fails to do a
purposeful and malicious act which if completed might result in death, this is
not attempted second degree murder since the actor did not intend murder.
If there can be no attempted second degree murder when the actor
intends, without premeditation, to kill and takes a substantial step to do so but
fails to accomplish his purpose, then a substantial gap exists in the law of
homicide. There would be no punishment for acts which society justifiably
considers seriously harmful.
Crozier requires rethinking of Wyoming's law of homicide. By doing
away with the intent to kill in second degree murder, the Wyoming Supreme
Court may have in fact enlarged the reach of second degree murder,
transferring some killings from the category of manslaughter to that of second
degree murder.
C. Manslaughterand CriminallyNegligentHomicide
The 1982 Criminal Code provided in section 6-2-105 that involuntary
manslaughter might be committed by killing, without malice, either recklessly
or in the commission of some unlawful act. Subsequently in 1985, the
provision that the killing might be in the commission of some unlawful act was
deleted, leaving involuntary manslaughter as a reckless killing.'2 1 At the same
time, the crime of criminally negligent homicide was enacted, and codified as
section 6-2-107.'' The result was rational, and made involuntary manslaughter
and criminally negligent homicide parallel to aggravated vehicular homicide
and vehicular homicide, in that recklessness is a required element of the first
and criminal negligence a required element of the second.
D.

Vehicular Homicide

Homicide by vehicle is embodied in section 6-2-106 of the Criminal
Code. Under section 6-2-106(a), a person commits homicide by vehicle where
he operates a vehicle in a criminally negligent manner and thereby causes the
death of another. Homicide by vehicle is a misdemeanor with a maximum
penalty of imprisonment for a year and a fine of $2,000. Under section 6-2-

125. 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 215, § 2.
126. Id. § 1.
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106(b), a person commits aggravated homicide by vehicle where he operates a
vehicle under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances, or recklessly,
and thereby causes the death of another person. Aggravated homicide by
vehicle is a felony with maximum imprisonment of twenty years.
Section 6-2-106 has provided a workable definition of vehicular
homicide. After more than 2 a half-century of confusion, the Wyoming
Legislature has gotten it right.' '
E.

Drug-InducedHomicide

In 1995, the Wyoming Legislature enacted section 6-2-108, punishing as
drug-induced homicide a death resulting from the delivery of a controlled
substance to a minor by an adult or a person four years older than the minor.'m
The impetus behind the statute was the public outrage experienced following
drug-related deaths of children, accompanied by the desire to punish severely
persons who furnished drugs to children.
The statute appears to have been drafted and enacted largely on impulse

and without careful consideration of its coverage and implications. First, the
incorporation of the four year age differential shibboleth'" may cause irrational
results. It means that if a person on his seventeenth birthday furnishes a
controlled substance to a child twelve years and 364 days old and the child
dies from using the substance, drug-induced homicide has been committed.
But if the same seventeen-year-old furnishes a controlled substance to a child
thirteen years and one day old with the same result, there is no crime apart
from delivery of the substance itself. Other age combinations may be
hypothesized.'" It is doubtful whether there is any empirical basis for the four
year differential in age.

127. The half-century of confusion included duplicative statutes, as well as statutes struck down as
unconstitutionally vague. State v. Sodergren, 686 P.2d 521 (Wyo. 1984). The "criminally negligent" and
"reckless" terms in the present section 6-2-106 are rationally distinguishable, and have provided a sound
basis for prosecuting deaths resulting from operation of vehicles.
128. 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 119, § 1.
129. For reasons unknown, the Wyoming Legislature has become convinced that in crimes against
children it is highly significant whether the actor is or is not four years older than the victim. This distinction did not originate in the drug-induced homicide statute. In sexual offenses, in Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§§ 6-2-303(a)(v) and 6-2-304(aXi) and (ii), a four year difference in age is the test of criminality. If a
child 16 years of age inflicts sexual intrusion on another child one day before the victim's 12th birthday,
so that there is a four-year differential in ages, second degree sexual assault has been committed, with a
potential sentence of 20 years if the actor is tried as an adult But in the same case if the actor is only 15
and not four years older than the victim, it is no offense at all. See also id. §§ 6-2-306(d)(iii), and 14-3105(b)(i) and (iiXC). In child abuse, the differential is six years. Id. § 6-2-503. In either case, it is doubtful whether there is any empirical evidence that the trauma to the child victim is nonexistent when the
actor is less than four, or six, years older.
130. Thus if an adult one day past his 18th birthday furnishes a controlled substance to a minor one
day short of his 18th birthday and death results, the statute applies.
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Second, if the purpose of the statute is to punish drug dealers and
distributors, then it must be noted that it punishes only those who deal directly
with the minor child who dies. If an adult delivers a controlled substance to a
child of twelve, who then gives it to another even younger child, and death of
the younger child results, the adult supplier will not be guilty of drug induced
homicide.
VI.

KIDNAPPING

Kidnapping is committed when the actor "unlawfully removes another
from his place of residence or business or from the vicinity where he was at

the time of removal, or if he unlawfully confines another." The removal or
confinement must be with intent to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or
hostage; or to facilitate the commission of a felony; or to inflict bodily injury
on or terrorize the victim or another. 3' Punishment for kidnapping is severe: up
to twenty years if the victim is voluntarily released substantially unharmed and
in a safe place prior to trial, and twenty years to life if the victim is not so
32

released.'

The Wyoming Supreme Court has construed the statute literally,
upholding convictions based on relatively short periods of confinement.'Where the victim was seized and removed a substantial distance in order to
perpetrate a sexual assault, the commission of the sexual assault authorized the
enhanced penalty in excess of twenty years, "because, once the sexual assault
is inflicted, the victim has been harmed and cannot be released 'substantially

unharmed." '"' On the other hand, the evidence must satisfy the allegations of
the criminal charge, so that where removal from the vicinity was charged, the
act of forcing the victims from one room to another within their place of
business during an armed robbery was insufficient: "removal from the vicinity
cannot refer to locational changes within a victim's residence or a business.'"

131. WyO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-201(a) (Michie 1997).
132. Id. § 6-2-201(c) and (d). All four of the conditions must be met in order for the defendant to
qualify for the lesser punishment: (1)voluntary release of the victim, (2) substantially unharmed, (3) in a
safe place, (4) prior to trial. Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1989).
133. In Darrow v. State, 824 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1992), in the course of committing an armed burglary,
to facilitate his getaway, Darrow ordered the victim to stay in the bedroom. Although it lasted only a
short time, this was a sufficient confinement to satisfy the statute. In Doud v. State, 845 P.2d 402 (Wyo.
1993), Doud forced his estranged wife from her vehicle and took her to his house. During the confinement, Doud threatened his wife with a gun and beat her, until she got possession of the gun and shot him
in the leg. Id. at 405. The supreme court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of
kidnapping and a sentence in excess of 20 years: Doud confined his wife with intent to inflict bodily
injury upon her or terrify her; the confinement was not required to be for a substantial period or in a
place of isolation; and he had not released her voluntarily. Id. at 408.
134. McDermott v. State, 870 P.2d 339, 347 (Wyo. 1994).
135. Keene v. State, 812 P.2d 147, 150 (Wyo. 1991). Had the criminal information charged confinement, rather than removal, it is not clear whether the evidence would have been sufficient. The court
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While kidnapping is a serious offense, in that removal or confinement
may subject the victim to substantial added risk of harm, it is also an offense
which requires careful definition and limitation in order to avoid excessive
punishment. Confinement or removal may be an incidental part of many
crimes, ranging from sexual assault to robbery. In the absence of statutory
language requiring that the confinement be for a substantial time or the
removal be a substantial distance, a charge of kidnapping could be added to a
charge of many other crimes against the person, with the possibility of a life
sentence for kidnapping added to the punishment for the other crime. It is true
that the Wyoming Supreme Court in Keene v. State recognized that forcing
robbery victims from one place to another within the business premises "must
be regarded as incidental to the conduct of the robbery. '"flh However, there is
no bright line test to identify when a confinement or removal will be
considered "incidental." Initially, the matter is left largely to prosecutorial
discretion, with the result that sharply differing punishments may result. Thus,
in the original Harvey and Phillips cases, the defendants were convicted of
kidnapping and first degree sexual assault when they seized the victim from a
Rock Springs street and conveyed her in their pickup truck to the outskirts of
the city, during which the victim was sexually assaulted.'" On the other hand,
in other cases of sexual assault involving removal"' or confinement,"19 no
kidnapping has been charged.
This is not to assert that Harvey and Phillips should not have been
charged with both sexual assault and kidnapping. But consideration should be
given to clarifying the kidnapping statute to avoid charges and convictions for
kidnapping where the removal or confinement is relatively minor and closely
connected to another crime.'- This can be accomplished through an
amendment to provide more precise definition. One solution would be to adopt
the language of the Model Penal Code, requiring that removal be a substantial
distance from the vicinity, and that the confinement be for a substantial period
concluded that "[tihc movement of Tucker and Hendricks from the office to the pharmacy area must be
regarded as incidental to the conduct of the robbery." Id. at 151.
136. Keene, 812 P.2d at 151.
137. Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989); Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 1989). Both

convictions were reversed for violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial. However, Phillips was
subsequently convicted of conspiracy to commit kidnapping and conspiracy to commit sexual assault,
(Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062 (vyo. 1992)), and Harvey was convicted of conspiracy to commit
kidnapping, (Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074 (Wyo. 1992)), and the convictions were affirmed. See also
Driskill v. State, 761 P.2d 980 (Wyo. 1988); Smith v. State, 715 P.2d 1164 (Wyo. 1986). In Smith, a
retail store was robbed and the clerk "was ordered into a back room, placed in a prone position, personally robbed, and left bound by duct tape."
138. See, e.g., Rathbun v. State, 802 P.2d 881 (Wyo. 1990); Gonzales v. State, 516 P.2d 592 (Wyo.

1973).

139. See, e.g., Righter v. State, 752 P.2d 416 (Wyo. 1988).
140. People v. Chessman, 238 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1951), comes to mind, where Caryl Chessman was

sentenced to death and executed for kidnapping when he forced the victim from her vehicle to his owna distance estimated at 20 feet-and sexually assaulted her.
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in a place of isolation." While such an amendment would not remove all
doubt, it would help to focus the crime of kidnapping upon the evils it is
intended to cover.
VII. SEXUAL OFFENSES

The greatest problem in the area of sexual offenses has probably been the
overlapping and confusion between the sexual assault statutes found at
sections 6-2-301 through 6-2-312, and the immodest, immoral or indecent
liberties statute, section 14-3-105. Whether this problem has been at least
partially solved by the 1997 legislation, or has been exacerbated by the recent
decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court in Pierson v. State,l" remains to be
seen.
A.

StatutoryRevision Since 1983

Wyoming's current sexual assault article was first enacted in 1977.' Four
degrees of sexual assault were created, and other provisions were adopted
providing penalties, creating a marital defense, providing for medical
examination of the victim, directing that names not be released prior to filing
of an information or indictment, abolishing the need for corroboration, and
limiting the introduction at trial of evidence of the victim's prior sexual
conduct.
Few changes were made in the sexual assault article from 1977 until
1983. The principal modification was made in sexual assault in the third and
fourth degree. In the original act, sexual assault in the third degree consisted of
sexual contact without serious bodily injury, and was punishable by
imprisonment for up to five years.'" Sexual assault in the fourth degree
consisted of sexual intrusion on a child under sixteen years of age by a person
at least four years older, and was punishable as a misdemeanor." By 1983, a
reversal had taken place, and sexual intrusion on a child under sixteen had
become sexual assault in the third degree, punishable by imprisonment for not
more than five years, while sexual contact was now a misdemeanor.'"
In 1983 as in 1977, sexual assault in the first degree included sexual
141. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (1985).
142. No. 96-91, 1998 WL 127888 (Wyo. Mar, 19, 1998).
143. 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 70, § 1. This act is now codified as WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-301 to 6-3-312 (Michie 1997).
144. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-304.
145. Id. § 64-305.
146. Sexual assault in the third degree was codified at WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-304 (Michic 1977 &
Supp. 1983), and sexual assault in the fourth degree at § 6-2-305. Both sexual assault in the third degree
and sexual assault in the fourth degree provided for enhanced punishment for multiple convictions. Id. §
6-2-306(a)(iii) and (iv), (b) and (c).
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intrusion by force or threats of immediate harm, or sexual intrusion of persons

physically helpless or mentally ill or deficient." Sexual assault in the first
degree was punishable by imprisonment for five to fifty years, with enhanced
punishment for multiple convictions." Sexual assault in the second degree
included sexual intrusion achieved by remote threats, by drugging the victim,
when the victim was under twelve and the actor at least four years older, by the
actor being in a position of authority, in improper course of medical treatment,
or by any means that would prevent resistance by a victim of ordinary
resolution."' Sexual assault in the second degree also included sexual contact
resulting in serious bodily injury,'" and was punishable by imprisonment for

not more than twenty years, with enhanced punishment for multiple
convictions.I '
Sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the second degree

have remained substantially unchanged since 1983. The only change has been
in sexual assault in the second degree: subsection (c) of section 6-2-303,

covering sexual contact of children between twelve and fifteen which resulted
in serious bodily injury, was repealed in 1997.112
In 1984, in an attempt to resolve the confusion between sexual assault
and immodest, immoral and indecent liberties under section 14-3-105, the
Legislature amended third degree sexual assault and fourth degree sexual
assault by adding the prefatory phrase, "[e]xcept under circumstances
constituting a violation of W.S. 14-3-105."'" Thus, if acts fell under section
14-3-105, they were excluded from third or fourth degree sexual assault.
Preference was thereby given to prosecution of many sexual acts against

147. Id § 6-2-302.
148. Id. § 6-2-306(a)(i),(b),(c). The provisions for enhanced punishment present a problem in construction. Section 6-2-306(a) provides that sexual assault in the first degree is punishable by imprisonment for five to 50 years, and second degree is punishable by imprisonment not more than 20 years.
Section 6-2-306(b)(i) and (c)(i) provide that a person who is being sentenced for two or more separate
acts of sexual assault in the first or second degree shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than
five years or for life. It is not clear whether the sentence of five years to life is to be imposed as a single
sentence for all convictions, or whether a sentence of five years to life is to be imposed for each of the
sexual acts committed. If the latter is true, a separate sentence for each sexual act, then a problem in the
nature of expostfacto arises, since the effect of the conviction for the second act of sexual assault is to
enhance the punishment for the first act. Assume that the defendant commits two separate acts of second
degree sexual assault. He is then charged, tried and convicted of both. While enhancement of the penalty
for the second act may be proper, enhancement of the penalty for the first is not. The maximum penalty
for the first act became determined at the time the act was committed. It should not be subject to enhancement by later legislative change, or by later acts committed by the defendant.
149. id § 6-2-303.
150. id.
151. Id. § 6-2-306(a)(ii),(b),(c).
152. 1997Wyo. Sess. Lawsch. 135,§2.
153. 1984 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 44, § 2. This legislation also added subsection (a)(ii) to section 6-2304, providing that sexual contact of a child under twelve, where no serious bodily injury was caused,
constituted sexual assault in the third degree.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol33/iss2/6

36

Lauer: The Wyoming Criminal Code Revisited: Reflections after Fifteen Ye

1998

WYOMING CRIMINAL CODE REVISITED

children as indecent liberties rather than sexual intrusion or sexual contact.
In 1997, the Legislature made significant changes in sexual assault in the
third degree and sexual assault in the fourth degree. Sexual assault in the
fourth degree was repealed. Sexual assault in the third degree was enlarged to
include any sexual contact with children under fourteen without serious bodily
injury, and other sexual contact under circumstances set forth in sections 6-2302 and 6-2-303. Third degree sexual assault gained precedence over indecent
liberties, as the limiting language requiring prosecution under the indecent
liberties statute was deleted and language was added to the indecent liberties
statute requiring prosecution under the third degree sexual assault statute. In
addition, the penalty for sexual assault in the third degree was increased from
imprisonment for a maximum of five years to a maximum of fifteen years."'
The penalty section, section 6-2-306, has been amended twice since 1983,
once in 1996 when subsection (d) was added providing for life imprisonment
without parole for third convictions,"' and once in 1997 when the Legislature
deleted penalties for the repealed fourth degree sexual assault and increased
penalties for third degree sexual assault."
Thus in the fifteen years since 1983, the principal change in Wyoming's
sexual assault law has been to increase the penalties for sexual assault in the
third degree, to give sexual assault precedence over indecent liberties, and to
provide for life imprisonment without parole for three-time offenders. Courts
now have authority to impose substantially greater punishments on sexual
offenders.
Since 1983, the Wyoming Supreme Court has decided several significant
sexual assault cases. In Jackson v. State,"' the court held that second degree
sexual assault is not a lesser included offense within first degree sexual assault;
in Craney v. State,"' it held that third degree sexual assault is not a lesser
included offense within first degree sexual assault. In Scadden v.State,'" the
court applied the "position of authority" subsection of second degree sexual
assault, section 6-2-303(aXvi), to affirm the conviction of a high school girls'
volleyball coach who had sexual intercourse with a seventeen-year-old
member of the team. In Story v. State,- the conviction of a physician who
inflicted sexual intrusion upon female patients while purporting to examine
them medically, was affirmed under the second degree sexual assault provision
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 135, §§ 1-2.
1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 73, § 2.
1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 135, § 2.
891 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1995).
798 P.2d 1202 (Wyo. 1990).
732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987).
721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo. 1986).
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of section 6-2-303(aXvii), "sexual intrusion in treatment or examination of a
victim for purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable

medical practices."
Wyoming's sexual assault statutes, which substantially expanded prior
rape law, are functioning with reasonable clarity and efficiency. The statute
has been the subject of a significant number of decisions by the Wyoming
Supreme Coum, resulting in the resolution of ambiguities and uncertainties,
and providing a rational interpretation of the statute.
B.

Immodest, Immoral or IndecentLiberties: Section 14-3-105

In 1957, the Wyoming Legislature enacted the Child Protection Act,
which provided in part that any person who knowingly took "immodest,
immoral or indecent liberties with any . . . child" was guilty of a felony

punishable by imprisonment for ten years."' Under the act, a "child" is a
person under the age of eighteen years. However, from 1978 until 1993,
"child" was defined as a person under the age of nineteen.?

The statute, now section 14-3-105, has been repeatedly attacked on the
ground that "immodest, immoral or indecent liberties:" is unconstitutionally
vague, and does not give fair notice of what acts are covered. The attack was
rejected in Sorenson v. State,'6 where the defendant had rubbed the breasts of a

twelve-year-old girl through her clothing and tried to put his hand inside her
shirt. The supreme court observed that "a person of ordinary intelligence can
weigh his contemplated conduct against a prohibition of taking immodest,
immoral or indecent liberties or assault against a child and know whether or

not such contemplated conduct is prohibited by it.","64 A further vagueness

161. 1957 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 22, § 8. The act, as amended, is now codified as WYO. STAT. ANN. §
14-3-105 (Michie 1997). This section of the act further made it unlawful for any person "knowingly to
cause or encourage any such child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him or her any
immoral or indecent act." This provision is wondrously ambiguous, since it is not at all clear whether the
forbidden act is for the actor to encourage a child to encourage another child to commit an immoral or
indecent act with the actor, or for the actor to encourage a child to encourage another child to commit an
immoral or indecent act with the first child. The ambiguous language has been retained in section 14-3105.
162. McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288, 290 (Wyo. 1985), held that under the 1957 act, "child" meant a
person under 18. 1978 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 25, § 1, provided that the age ofmajority should be 19. This
was construed to make any person under 19 a "child," within the meaning of the indecent liberties statute. Campbell v. State, 709 P.2d 425, 427 (Wyo. 1985). The age of 18 was restored by 1993 Wyo. Sess.
Laws ch. 1, § I, which added subsection (b) to section 14-3-105: "As used in this section, 'child' means
a person under the age of eighteen (18) years."
163. 604 P.2d 1031, 1035 (Wyo. 1979).
164. In Britt v. State, 752 P.2d 426, 428 (Wyo. 1988), where the male defendant had rubbed the
crotch of two teenage boys, the court declined to overrule Sorenson, observing that "a person of ordinary
intelligence would know that the rubbing and grabbing of the penises of thirteen and fourteen year-old
boys is clearly conduct which is forbidden as 'immodest, immoral or indecent liberties."'
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challenge was rejected in Ochoa v. State,"' where the supreme court stated:
Our indecent liberties statute clearly proscribes the conduct, sexual
intercourse with a minor, engaged in by Ochoa. We have repeatedly
interpreted this statute to apply where an adult engaged in sexual
intercourse with a minor .... As we said in Griego [v. State, 761
P.2d 973, 976 (Wyo. 1988)], "[t]hese decisions demonstrate that §
14-3-105 applies, without question to certain activities."... One of
those activities is sexual intercourse with a minor.
Subsequently in 1996, in Moore v. State,'" the supreme court reaffirmed that
the indecent liberties statute applies when an adult engages in sexual
intercourse with a minor.
During this period, the supreme court was also called upon to determine
the interrelationship between the indecent liberties statute, section 14-3-105,
which proscribed indecent liberties with children under eighteen (or nineteen),
and the sexual assault statute, which provided in section 6-2-304 that sexual
intercourse with a child under sixteen by a person four years older was
unlawful. The defendant argued that the unlawfulness of sexual intercourse
with children is governed by the sexual assault statute, so that sexual
intercourse with a child sixteen or older was not unlawful, and could not be
prosecuted as indecent liberties under section 14-3-105. The supreme court
emphatically rejected this argument, holding in McArtor v. State7 that the
sexual assault statute neither repealed nor took precedence over section 14-3105 in regard to acts of sexual intercourse, so that an act of sexual intercourse
with a girl of sixteen could be prosecuted under the indecent liberties statute.'"
In 1984, the Wyoming Legislature affirmed the precedence of the
indecent liberties statute by prefacing both section 6-2-304, proscribing sexual
intercourse with children under sixteen, and section 6-2-305, proscribing

165. 848 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Wyo. 1993).
166. 912 P.2d 1113, 1115-16 (Wyo. 1996). See also Roberts v. State, 912 P.2d I110 (Wyo. 1996).
Roberts was a probation revocation case where the district court concluded that Roberts had violated his
probation by engaging in indecent liberties with his 13 year old daughter in violation of section 14-3105, by jumping into her bed in the morning and rubbing her side and nuzzling her neck and mouth with
his nose. The supreme court concluded that the evidence supported the "factual conclusion that Roberts'
acts were indecent as contemplated by the statute." Id. at 1112.
167. 699 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1985). Justices Rose and Cardine dissented, pointing out the incongruity
that under section 6-2-304 at the time of the act in question, a person four years older than a child under
16 could only be punished by imprisonment for one year for an act of consensual sexual intercourse with
the child, while under section 14-3-105 any person could be imprisoned for "ten years for sexual intercourse with, or even for touching the breast, of a child under eighteen." Justices Rose and Cardine concluded that sexual intercourse with children should be prosecuted only under the sexual assault statutes.
168. The argument that prosecutions for sexual intercourse with children could only be brought under
the sexual assault statutes was also rejected in Ketcham v. State, 618 P.2d 1356 (Wyo. 1980), and Campbellv. State, 709 P.2d 425 (Wyo. 1985).
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sexual contact, with the phrase "[e]xcept under circumstances constituting a
violation of W.S. 14-3-105."'19 Thus, only where sexual intercourse with a
child under sixteen was not an indecent liberty could there be a prosecution
under section 6-2-304(a)(i). The Legislature had signaled its intention that
sexual intercourse with children would be subject to the ten year penalty of
section 14-3-105. Given the holdings of the Wyoming Supreme Court, it
seemed it would be difficult if not impossible to hypothesize a situation where
section 6-2-304(aXi) could provide the basis for prosecution.
However, when the Wyoming Legislature in 1997 increased the penalties
for sexual intercourse with children under sixteen and for sexual contact, it
also directed that prosecutions should be brought under section 6-2-304 rather
than section 14-3-105. It is now section 14-3-105 which is prefaced by
"[e]xcept under circumstance [sic] constituting sexual assault in the first,
second or third degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304." 1"
Given the Wyoming Supreme Court's repeated declarations that sexual
intercourse by an adult with a minor constitutes indecent liberties, the court's
decision in Pierson v. State,"' announced March 19, 1998, came as a surprise
to many. Pierson was convicted of indecent liberties, upon evidence showing
that while he was thirty-six years old and married, he had sexual intercourse
with a sixteen-year-old girl. On appeal, Pierson claimed that the evidence
showed that the girl had consented to sexual intercourse, and that he was
entitled to defend on the ground that her consent, while not a complete
defense, was nevertheless a factor to be considered by the jury in its
determination that the act of sexual intercourse was immodest, immoral or
indecent. The trial court rejected this defense and instructed the jury that it is
not a defense to indecent liberties that the child consented.
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, over the dissent of two justices.
The majority sought to make sense of the pre-1997 law, pointing out that the
Legislature had determined that sexual intercourse with a child under sixteen
should bear a maximum imprisonment of five years, and that immodest,
immoral or indecent liberties (which might include sexual intercourse with a
child under eighteen) could be punished by imprisonment for ten years.
Therefore, it concluded that the Legislature intended that indecent liberties
under section 14-3-105 must "entail conduct which is more culpable than the
conduct which constitutes guilt under Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-304." To satisfy section
14-3-105, a prosecutor must show not only sexual intercourse with a child
(which might satisfy section 6-2-304), but also that the sexual intercourse was

169. 1984 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch.44, § 2.
170. 1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 135, § 1.
171. No. 96-91, 1998 WL 127888 (Wyo. Mar. 19, 1998).
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"immodest, immoral or indecent." Therefore, in every prosecution under
section 14-3-105, the jury must find that the conduct was in fact immodest,
immoral or indecent, and in doing so the jury is entitled to consider the totality
of the circumstances, including whether the conduct was consensual in those
cases where the child was over sixteen.12
The upshot of Pierson seems to be that it is no longer possible to instruct
the jury that particular conduct such as sexual intercourse with a child
constitutes indecent liberties per se. The jury must now find that the accused
engaged in conduct which the "common sense of society would regard as
indecent and improper." Sexual intercourse with a consenting child over the
age of sixteen might or might not qualify. "We recognize that in many cases
sexual intercourse between a minor and an adult will constitute a violation of
that standard, but it' is up to the jury to make that determination in light of all
the material facts."'
The facts in Pierson arose before the 1997 amendments to the sexual
assault and indecent liberties statutes. The punishment structure and the
provisions giving indecent liberties precedence have now been radically
changed. Does this mean that Pierson is limited to acts which took place under
the law as it existed before 1997? Further analysis is needed. But it is clear that
many older complaints regarding the interplay between sexual assault and
indecent liberties have been swept away by the 1997 amendments.
C.

The MaritalDefense

When the Wyoming sexual assault statute was adopted in 1977, section
6-63.7 created a marital defense: "A person does not violate any provision of
this act if the actor and the victim are legally married, unless a decree of

judicial separation or restraining order has been granted.""' In the 1983
codification, this section was amended in a somewhat opaque manner,
stripping away much of the defense: "§ 6-2-307. Evidence of marriage as
172. The court had indicated in Moore v. State, 912 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Wyo. 1996), that a girl of 16
lacked capacity to consent to sexual intercourse. Pierson would appear to hold that only a child of less
than 16 lacks capacity to consent.
173. Pierson, No. 96-91, 1998 WL 127888, at *9. What once appeared to be a rule of law--sexual
intercourse with a child constituted an indecent liberty-is now a question for the jury-was this act of
sexual intercourse with a child an immodest, immoral or indecent liberty? The Piersondecision seems to
contradict Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr's. doctrine of specification by which legal standards become rules
of law. Under Holmes' theory, the courts begin by asking the jury such questions as "if you find that the
defendant drove on the left side of the roadway, was he negligent in doing so?"--but with the passage of
time through the process of specification the question becomes simply "did the defendant drive on the
left side of the roadway?" The court has concluded from jury determinations that driving on the left side
constitutes negligence, which has become a rule of law. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
LAW 110-15, 120-25 (1881). Piersonhas taken what was believed to be a settled rule and made it ajury
question.
174. 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 70, § 1.
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defense. The fact that the actor and the victim are married to each other is not
by itself a defense to a violation of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) or 6-2303(aXi), (ii), (iii) or (vi)." If marriage "by itself" was not a defense, the
question remained as to what in addition to marriage would be a defense?
The question was never to be answered. In Shunn v. State,'' where a
separated husband subject to a mutual restraining order sexually assaulted his
wife, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the sexual assault legislation had
repealed the common law marital defense, and that the court would not
reinstate it. The court declared that "no rational basis exists for distinguishing
between marital and nonmarital rape. The degree of violence is no less when
the victim of a rape is the spouse of the actor."''
At most, section 6-2-307 has become a nullity under the Shunn ruling. At
worst, its continued presence in the Criminal Code could be seriously
misleading.'" The Legislature should respond to Shunn by repealing section 62-307, or by amending it to conform to Shunn.
VIII. ASSAULT AND BATTERY
A.

Simple Assault: An Anachronism

In Wyoming, simple assault is the crime of attempting to commit one
form of battery. Section 6-2-501(a) provides: "A person is guilty of simple
assault if, having the present ability to do so, he unlawfully attempts to cause
bodily injury to another. "I" The punishment for simple assault is a fine of not
more than $750; there is no provision for imprisonment. Wyoming's simple
assault statute restates the common law, and is significantly narrower than the
great number of American assault statutes, which also include intentionally
placing another in apprehension of an immediate battery.'
The advent of the general inchoate crime of attempt has rendered
Wyoming's simple assault law a useless nullity. Now it is possible to charge
attempted battery rather than simple assault. Attempted battery is broader than
175. 742 P.2d 775 (Wyo. 1987).
176. Id. at 778.
177. This is not to suggest that persons who sexually assault their spouses are likely to consult the
Criminal Code before embarking. But the presence in our statute books of provisions which have been
judicially abnegated cannot be consistent with the Rule of Law.
178. The genesis of section 6-2-501(a) is found in 1869 Wyo. Terr. Sess. Laws ch. 3, tit. III, § 30:
"An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability to commit a violent injury on the
person of another."
179. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANriVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.16 at 213
(1986). New Mexico's assault statute includes a third category in addition to attempted battery and
putting a person in apprehension of immediate battery. N.M. ANN. STAT. § 30-3-1(C) (1994) provides:
"Assault consists of either [sic]: ... C. the use of insulting language toward another impugning his
honor, delicacy or reputation."
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simple assault, in that battery is committed when the actor "unlawfully touches
another in a rude, insolent or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another."", Thus it is a crime to attempt to
touch another unlawfully in a rude, insolent or angry manner, or to attempt to
cause bodily injury to another. To prove attempted battery, it is not necessary
to show that the actor had the present ability to cause injury, and the
possibilities for punishment are broader than for simple assault: imprisonment
for not more than six months, a fime not to exceed $750, or both."'
The Legislature should either repeal the simple assault statute or,
preferably, broaden it to include not only attempts to commit a battery but also
threats to commit an immediate battery. Any amendment of the statute should
also expand the possible punishment to include imprisonment. Such an
amendment would not only bring Wyoming into line with the law of other
states, but could contribute to keeping the peace by providing sanctions against
threats of immediate violence.lu
B. Domestic Violence Enhancement
In 1996, the Wyoming Legislature amended the assault and battery
statutes to provide enhanced punishment for second or subsequent acts of
simple assault or battery by one "household member" against another. A
second simple assault conviction carries the enhanced possibility of
imprisonment for six months; a second battery conviction is a high
misdemeanor with maximum imprisonment for one year and fine of $1,000; a
third or subsequent battery conviction is a felony with maximum
imprisonment of two years and a fine of $2,000."11
"Household member" is defined in section 35-21-102(a)(iv), and means:
(A) Persons married to each other;
(B) Persons living with each other as if married;
(C) Persons formerly married to each other;
(D) Persons formerly living with each other as if married;

180. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-501(b) (Michie 1997).
181. Id. § 6-2-501(d).
182. Threats are now covered in the stalking statute, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(a)(ii), but the
stalking statute does not cover a single isolated threat but instead requires that the actor engage in a
course of conduct.
183. 1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 75, § 1; ch. 91, § 1. The enactment has been codified at WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-501(e) and (f). The battery enhancement applies only where the second battery conviction is
within five years of the first, or where the third conviction is within 10 years of the first.
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(E) Parents and their adult children;
(F) Other adults sharing common living quarters; and
(G) Persons who are the parents of a child but who are not living
with each other.
This definition may leave a bit to be desired. For example, what does "living
with each other as if married" mean? Does it require that the persons hold
themselves out as married--or only that they have sexual relations with one
another? Next, certain classes of persons likely to engage in domestic violence
have been excluded, particularly minors and persons who commit battery upon
them. Thus, the definition only includes parents and adult children, and adults
sharing common living quarters. A minor who successively commits battery
against a parent or another minor or another adult with whom the minor is
sharing living quarters is not a "household member." Likewise, repeated
battery of a minor over sixteen but under eighteen years of age is not
included.I" The reason for not including minors is not clear. The answer may
lie in the fact that the Legislature unwisely made use of a definition created for
another purpose."

A second problem with enhancement under section 6-2-501(e) or (f) is a
practical one, which will fade with the passage of time. In the past, some
judges have declined to appoint counsel for some indigent persons accused of
simple assault and battery, evidently on the ground that conviction would
bring only a fine and not imprisonment.1" Under the Wyoming Public
Defender Act, the court need only appoint counsel when the defendant is
indigent and is charged with a "serious crime"--being a crime "for which
incarceration as a punishment is a practical possibility."8 In Brisson v. State,lu
decided on March 18, 1998, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that an
uncounseled prior conviction-i.e., one where an indigent person had been

184. Child abuse under WYo. STAT. AN. § 6-2-503, as amended by 1998 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 93, §
1, includes only children under 16 years except when committed by a person who is responsible for the
child's welfare, in which case children under 18 are included. Thus, repeated battery upon a person
between 16 and 18 by someone with whom the child is sharing living quarters (other than parent, stepparent or guardian) does not qualify for enhanced punishment under section 6-2-501(e) or (f). The definition of a person responsible for a child's welfare is found in section 14-3-202(a)(i).
185. Other conceptual shortcomings are evident. There is no provision for enhancement when a
conviction for battery follows one for simple assault-or simple assault follows battery. Nor does attempted battery provide a predicate for enhancement; there must be an actual rude, insolent or angry
touching, or an actual bodily injury.
186. The question arose only when the defendant expressed that he was indigent and wished to have
counsel appointed for him. A person who was not indigent and who appeared without counsel, or an
indigent person who knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel, could not claim denial of the right to
counsel.
187. Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-6-104(a)(i) and 7-6-102(a)(v).
188. No. 97-67, 1998 WL 117918 (Wyo. Mar. 18, 1998).
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denied counsel--could not be used to enhance the penalty for a subsequent
conviction of battery." The supreme court held that "practical possibility"
meant "something that is capable of occurring," thereby affirming a right to
court-appointed counsel in every misdemeanor case in which the statute
permits incarceration. The result of Brisson is likely to be salutary for indigent
persons accused of any misdemeanor for which imprisonment may be
imposed, including simple battery, as well as for such persons convicted
earlier of battery after being denied counsel. The result is less beneficial for the
State Public Defender, whose budget must now extend to providing counsel
for virtually all indigent persons charged with a misdemeanor.Y
C.

ChildAbuse

Wyoming's child abuse statute, section 6-2-503, originally applied to
persons who intentionally or recklessly inflicted physical or mental injury
upon a child under sixteen years of age."' The 1998 Legislature amended the
child abuse statute by enacting a new subsection (b) providing that a person
responsible for a child's welfare who intentionally or recklessly inflicts
physical or mental injury on a child under eighteen, is guilty of child abuse.-2
It is not clear that the incidence of child abuse by parents and others in a
similar position upon children between sixteen and eighteen years of age
constitutes a serious problem. While the new statute does contain an
exemption for physical injury resulting from "reasonable corporal
punishment," the application of the new subsection may lack parity. Thus,
where mother and seventeen-year-old daughter quarrel and daughter slaps
mother, inflicting bruises, daughter has committed battery, a misdemeanor. If
mother slaps back, not in self-defense, and inflicts similar bruises, mother is
guilty of a felony punishable by a maximum of five years in prison. While
concern for the well-being of children is commendable, excessive legislative
zeal and its unintended consequences is not.

189. The certified question in Brisson was limited to a prior uncounscled battery conviction. Whether
the supreme court's reasoning would extend to a prior uncounscled simple assault conviction, for which
there was no possibility of incarceration and therefore no right to appointment of counsel for an indigent
defendant, must await an answer in another case.
190. Brisson is based on the Wyoming Supreme Court's interpretation of Wyoming law, namely the
public defender statute. The Brisson decision declined to follow Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738
(1994), where it was held that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could provide the basis for
enhancing the sentence for a subsequent conviction. Other states have chosen to follow Nichols, declining to extend the constitutional right to counsel. See, e.g., State v. Woodruff, 951 P.2d 605 (N.M. 1997).
191. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-503 (Michie 1977).
192. 1998 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 93, § 1. "Person responsible for a child's welfare" is defined in WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-202(a)(i) to include "the child's parent, noncustodial parent, guardian, stepparent,
foster parent or other person, institution or agency having the physical custody or control of the child."

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1998

45

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 33 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 6
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXIII

D. Stalking
When personal relationships are terminated at the instigation of one of the
parties, it is not unusual for the other party to seek to reinstate the relationship,
and failing, to harass the person who terminated the relationship. Continued
acts of harassment can cause irritation, alarm and fear in the party harassed,
and can also lead to violence.'"3 To deal with harassment of this nature, the
Wyoming Legislature in 1993 created the crime of stalking, which punishes a
person who engages in a course of conduct intended to harass or threaten
another."' A "course of conduct" is "a pattern of conduct composed of a series
of acts over any period of time evidencing a continuity of purpose."' To
"harass" is to engage in a course of conduct involving verbal or written threats,
vandalism, or nonconsensual physical contact which the actor knows or should
know will cause substantial emotional distress, and which does cause alarm."
Acts of harassment include communication "in a manner that harasses," and
following or placing a person under surveillance."- Stalking is a misdemeanor
unless the defendant had a prior conviction within the preceding five years, or
caused serious bodily injury, or acted in violation of a condition of probation,
parole or bail, or in violation of a court order of protection-in which case
stalking is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years.'"
The constitutionality of the stalking statutes has been upheld by the
Wyoming Supreme Court against contentions that the statutes are vague and
overbroad." In addition, the constitutionality of the enhancement to a felony
when the act of stalking is committed in violation of a condition of probation,
parole or bail, has been upheld.2 ' In Vit v. State,"' a felony stalking conviction
was afftrmed. Vit continued to harass his former woman friend in violation of
a probation condition denying him any contact with her.
While the stalking statute is cumbersome, requiring the State to prove

193. See, e.g., Christian v. State, 883 P.2d 376 (Wyo. 1994). In that case, Lauree Betty Christian
engaged in a series of acts of property destruction and arson against vehicles owned by her former husband and his new female companion.
194. 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 92, § I (codified at Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506). The 1993 act also
included what are now sections 7-3-506 through 7-3-511, which provide that any victim of stalking may
apply to a court for an order of protection directing a person to refrain from further acts of stalking.
Section 7-3-510(c) provides that willful violation of an order of protection is punishable as a misdemeanor. However, section 6-2-506(e) provides that if a person who is subject to a protective order is
convicted of the crime of stalking in violation of that order, the stalking is a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years.
195. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(a)(i).
196. id. § 6-2-506(a)(ii).
197. Id. § 6-2-506(b).
198. Id. § 6-2-506(d),(e).
199. Luplow v. State, 897 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1995).
200. Garton v. State, 910 P.2d 1348 (Wyo. 1996).
201. 909 P.2d953 (Wyo. 1996).
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specific intent to harass, and that the defendant knew or should have known
that his conduct "would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress," as well as that the victim was in fact seriously alarmed by
the conduct, no serious problems in interpretation or enforcement appear to
have arisen. Only time will tell whether changes are desirable or necessary.
IX. PROPERTY CRIMES

Wyoming's property crimes largely follow traditional patterns, little
different from the statutes in force at the beginning of the century. The most
significant questions are whether the existing statutes are adequate to deal with
the increasing sophistication and variety of commercial and other frauds, and
whether crimes involving electronic technology are covered.
A.

Arson

The arson statutes have been amended to create the crime of aggravated
arson where the actor maliciously starts a fire or causes an explosion with
intent to destroy an occupied structure under circumstances evidencing
reckless disregard for human life, and another person is killed or suffers
serious bodily injury at the scene or in emergency response to the incident."'
Aggravated arson is punishable by a maximum sentence of thirty years.2" The
amendment was not necessary to deal with cases where in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate arson the actor kills another person, since that has long
constituted felony murder.- Rather, the amendment is directed to injury to
persons at the scene, and to death or injury to firemen responding to the fire or
explosion. The amendment poses two possible problems. While in the first
degree arson statute the intent is "to destroy or damage an occupied
structure, 'u- aggravated arson is limited to "intent to destroy." An intent
merely to damage the structure is not sufficient. Further, it is unclear what will
qualify as "circumstances evidencing reckless disregard for human life."
Arguably, any act of starting a fire or causing an explosion with intent to
destroy an occupied structure would qualify-thereby rendering the reckless
disregard element unnecessary.
In 1993, the Legislature added section 6-3-111, creating the felony crime
of manufacturing, possessing or delivering explosives and explosive devices
with intent to injure another person or to damage property. The statute applies
to conduct which would fall short of arson or attempted arson. Also in 1993,

202. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-101(c). The statute was amended in 1993. 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch.

166, § 2.
203. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-101(d).
204. Id § 6-2-101(a).

205. Id § 6-3-101(a).
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the Legislature enacted section 6-3-112, providing penalties for willfully
destroying or interfering with the use of firefighting equipment, or hindering or
interfering with firefighters. These crimes are high misdemeanors, bearing a
maximum penalty of a year in jail and a fine of $1,000. The prohibited conduct
is serious enough to justify felony punishment in many cases. It is unclear why
the Legislature limited the crimes to misdemeanor status.
B.

Cruelty to Animals

Under section 6-3-203(aXi), a person who knowingly "deprives an
animal of necessary sustenance" commits cruelty to animals. The crime is a
misdemeanor."' In Amrein v. State, decided in 1992, the defendant was
convicted of eight counts of cruelty to animals. Amrein failed to provide food
and water to eight horses and cattle, and was sentenced to eight consecutive
terms of six months' imprisonment in the county jail and eight fines of $750
each. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the statute was
ambiguous, because it was not clear whether mistreating eight animals was a
single crime or eight separate crimes, one for each animal.- Ruling in favor of
lenity, the court held that mistreating multiple animals was a single offense.
The Wyoming Legislature responded in 1994 by adding a new subsection
(k) to section 6-3-203: "Each animal affected by the defendant's conduct may
constitute a separate count for the purposes of prosecution, conviction,
sentencing and penalties under this section."' " The Legislature recognized that
the offense of cruelty to animals is based upon the fact that animals are
sentient beings, and that each suffers personal pain when mistreated.
C.

Burglary

At the common law, burglary was the breaking and entering of the
dwelling house of another in the night time with intent to commit a felony
therein. Particularly over the last two centuries, the scope of the crime of
burglary has been greatly extended, so that Wyoming's burglary statute,
section 6-3-301, now encompasses any unauthorized entry or remaining in any
building, occupied structure or vehicle, with intent to steal or commit a felony
therein.
Under the 1982 Criminal Code, the Wyoming Supreme Court has been
called upon several times to construe the applicability of the burglary statute.
206. Id. § 6-2-203(a)(i),(e).
207. 836 P.2d 862 (Wyo. 1992). This resolution of the case avoided having to decide whether a justice of the peace, whose jurisdiction was limited to misdemeanors with maximum penalties of imprisonment for six months and a fine of $750, had power to impose a sentence which cumulated the penalties for eight misdemeanors and resulted in four years in jail and a fine of $6,000.
208. 1994 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 23, § 1.
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In Longstreth v. State,- the court held that the State was required to prove the
fact of unauthorized entry, which would not be inferred. In Smith v. State,10 the
court applied a functional test to hold that a semi-trailer without wheels or
doors, used to store property, was a building. The court was willing to consider
that the structure was used to contain and shelter property, and its existence
gave notice of the owner's claim to privacy and exclusivity, even though the
interior was not entirely enclosed.'
Wyoming's burglary statute was examined at length in a Landand Water
Law Review article which this author wrote a year ago, and the reader is
referred to the article for fuller commentary.21'
D. Larceny
The 1982 Criminal Code took steps toward creation of a unified statute
embracing the various forms of stealing, but got no further than combining
larceny, larceny by bailee and embezzlement in a single statute."3 There
remain a number of other separate statutes which cover forms of stealing, such
as shoplifting, defrauding an innkeeper, theft of services and theft of
telecommunications services. To avoid problems of creating cracks into which
acts depriving persons of their property may fall, the Legislature should
consider further consolidation of property crimes. Gaps in coverage both
encourage the nefarious and frustrate those seeking to enforce the law.
"Property" is defined in the Criminal Code to mean "anything of value
whether tangible or intangible, real or personal, public or private."'' The
Wyoming Supreme Court held in Dreiman v. State"' that information is
property, so that when Dreiman entered his former woman friend's home
without authority, with intent to obtain her unlisted phone number, he
committed burglary-the unauthorized entry of an occupied structure with
intent to commit larceny therein.
E. FraudCrimes
Fraud exists in Wyoming, as elsewhere in this world. The existence of
criminal statutes punishing frauds ranging from false pretenses to defrauding
creditors demonstrates that the Wyoming Legislature intends that persons

209. 832 P.2d 960 (Wyo. 1992).
210. 902 P.2d 712 (Wyo. 1995).
211. Some intriguing questions remain unanswered. Thus is it possible to enter a vehicle and steal it
without committing burglary?
212. Theodore E. Lauer, Burglary in Wyoming, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 721 (1997).
213. WYO.STAT. ANN. § 6-3-402 (Michie 1997).
214. Id. § 6-1-104(a)(viii).
215. 825 P.2d 758 (Wyo. 1992).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1998

49

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 33 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 6
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXIII

defrauding others should be subjected to criminal prosecution and punishment.
Unfortunately, Wyoming prosecutors and courts have often failed to handle
criminal fraud cases in a manner consistent with the underlying legislative
intent. For one thing, the courts have tended to relegate fraud to being merely a
"civil matter," which should be dealt with in the civil courts and not through
criminal punishment.1'6 For another, prosecutors have sometimes insufficiently
analyzed the facts of their cases in light of the statutory elements of fraud
crimes.
Two examples will suffice. In Miller v. State,17 John G. Miller was
convicted of two counts of obtaining property under false pretenses."' Miller, a
lawyer turned home builder, executed two false lien affidavits in the sale of
two homes. The affidavits falsely stated that all persons who furnished
services, labor or materials had been paid, so that no liens could attach to the
homes. Miller thereby obtained $92,950 from one buyer and $100,000 from
the other. The statements were false, in that debts were owed to
subcontractors. The subcontractors then filed liens against the two properties,
and Miller went into bankruptcy. However, the liens were never perfected,
since suit was not filed upon the liens within the required statutory period.
Therefore, the buyers of the properties never suffered an actual loss by being
required to pay the subcontractors in order to discharge the liens.
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed Miller's convictions, holding that
there was insufficient evidence that Miller had intended to defraud anyone. In
an opinion by Justice Urbigkit, the court found that since Miller had paid off
liens in the past, and that there was title insurance to protect the buyers against
loss, there was no "requisite intent to defraud to sustain the conviction under
the false-pretense statute. 21'
With all due respect, the Wyoming Supreme Court simply got it wrong.
The fact that the buyers were not shown to have suffered an actual monetary
loss from Miller's false affidavits does not absolve Miller from having made
false pretenses within the meaning of the statute. The fact was that Miller
made a false statement and thereby induced the buyers to part with the full
purchase money for the homes. Had Miller told the truth, the buyers would not
216. The underlying sentiment may be that while robbers and burglars are true criminals, the "slick"
dealer is only an entrepreneur who has somehow slipped across the line, and is really a respectable
citizen at heart. We seem to admire persons with wealth, no matter how they acquired it.
217. 732 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1987).

218. Because Miller's acts occurred in 1982, prior to the effective date of the Wyoming Criminal
Code, the prosecutions were brought under the former false pretenses statute, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-

106, which provided punishment for persons who "knowingly and designedly, by false pretense or
pretenses, obtain from any other person or persons any ehoses in action, money, goods, wares, chattels,
effects, or other valuable thing whatever, with intent to cheat or defraud any such person or persons of
the same." Jd
219. Miler,732 P.2d at 1064.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol33/iss2/6

50

Lauer: The Wyoming Criminal Code Revisited: Reflections after Fifteen Ye
1998

WYOMING CRIMINAL CODE REVISITED

have paid the money. To get the money, Miller lied in his affidavit. Miller's
false statement exposed the buyers to the risk that the subcontractors would
assert and enforce their liens. The fact that they never filed suit on the liens
does not relieve Miller from having obtained the purchase money under the
false pretense that no liens could be filed.
In concluding that there was no intent to defraud, the court cited decisions
from other states involving cases where persons contracted to paint barns or
build houses, accepted down payments, and then failed to perform, and no
criminal conduct was found.' However, these were cases where no
misrepresentation of a presently existing fact was made; the representations
went to performance of future acts. In Miller, on the other hand, a presently
existing fact was misrepresented: that all persons who had furnished labor,
services or material had been paid.John Miller did not make a promise that all
subcontractors would be paid in the future; he made the statement that they
had already been paid. This was a false pretense. The Wyoming Supreme
Court's attitude seemed to be that Miller knowingly lied but, after all, he was a
respectable businessman who really intended to pay the subcontractors, and
therefore could not possibly be a criminal.'"
In Lahr v. State,' Joseph Lahr was convicted of larceny by bailee when
he taught courses in basic life trauma support, and then collected twice for his
services, once from the hospital which sponsored the courses, and once from
the mining companies at whose mine sites the courses were taught. The theory
of prosecution was that when moneys were paid by the mining companies to
Lahr, he became a bailee of such moneys for the hospital, and when he did not
account to the hospital for the moneys, he was guilty of larceny by bailee. The
Wyoming Supreme Court reversed Lahr's conviction, holding that the
evidence did not support the element of the crime that Lahr was a bailee of or
had been entrusted with the hospital's money. Thus, the mining companies
were not shown to have believed they were paying the hospital through Lahr,
nor did Lahr represent to the mining companies that he was collecting for the
hospital. As far as the mining companies were concerned, they were paying
Lahr for his services.

220. Miller, 732 P.2d at 1064 (citing, inter alia, State v. Basham, 568 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. App. 1978),
and Commonwealth v. True, 455 N.E. 2d 453 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983)).

221. There was also an undertone that since there was title insurance which protected against such
liens, eveything was all right, "since the insurance provided the assurance against liens which would
foreclose harm," and the insurer "continued its profit expectancy for premium fee as consideration for
the lien payment risk." Miller, 732 P.2d at 1064. But again, with all respect, if the insurance company
had to pay because of the false affidavits, a loss would have been suffered. The fact that the insurer
consented to the risk does not justify the conclusion that thereby it assented to Miller making false
statements which required it to pay the loss.
222. 840 P.2d 930 (Wyo. 1992).
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The court stressed that when the State charged a crime, the elements of
that crime must be proved. "The law of theft and larceny has been recodified
and its language has been simplified, but proof of the specific crime charged
must still be made and tested against the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard."t m So far, the court had it right. The State had charged a crime it
could not prove. But the court then went on to expose its underlying feelings
regarding fraud crimes:
In so holding, we do not condone the appellant's actions or propose
to suggest that no remedy at law exists. This matter had, from its inception, the markings of a civil problem between the appellant and
Memorial Hospital. The appellee failed in its effort to establish the
existence of a crime or of an intent to deceive or defraud. In its
brief, the appellee used such terms as "bilk," "over billed," and
"double billed," and a great deal of the testimony at trial was along
those same lines. Wyoming law does not necessarily define such
behavior as being criminal, even though it might be readily subject
to a remedy in the civil courtsY
And here the court again got it wrong. Double-billing, whereby an actor
intentionally and knowingly collects a claimed debt from one person after he
has already collected that same debt from another person, or collects twice
from the same person, necessarily involves a false pretense: 1) that you owe
the money, and 2) the money has not been paid. The intent to defraud is
present because the actor falsely asserts that the debt remains due after it has
already been paid.On the other hand, the Wyoming Supreme Court most assuredly got it
right in Craverv. State,- when it held that false pretenses may be committed
when a person accepts money or property in exchange for making a promise
which he knows he cannot keep or which he does not intend to keep. Fraud
involves knowing misrepresentation of a past or existing fact. Fraud is not
committed when a person makes a promise as to doing some act in the future
and then fails to keep it-unless at the time of making the promise the person
knows that he cannot keep it or that he does not intend to keep it. As Lord
223. Id.at 933.
224. Id.at 933.
225. It is possible that the creditor could innocently collect twice, either from different persons, or
from the same person. Retention of the second payment, with intent to deprive the person who had made
the second payment, could constitute larceny by bailee. Note the distinction: One who intentionally
double bills, intending that the debt be paid twice (or one who bills once for a debt which he knows is
non-existent) and thereby to obtain moneys to which he is not entitled, is guilty of false pretenses. One
who merely is paid money to which he is not entitled has made no false pretense, but has become a
bailee of the money, and can be guilty of larceny by converting it to his own use. Compare WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 6-3-401 and 6-3-407 (Michie 1997).
226. 942 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1997).
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7 in 1884, "ft]he state of a man's
Bowen observed in Edgington v. Fitzmaurice"
mind is as much fact as the state of his digestion." Bobby Charles Craver had
entered into contracts to install siding, windows and doors, and accepted
money, promising performance by stated dates, when he knew that his
promises were false because he could not or would not perform. His
conviction for false pretenses was affirmed.

Wyoming's fraud crimes need to be examined with utmost care, to
determine whether they constitute a sufficient arsenal to deal with present or
anticipated criminal schemes to separate Wyoming residents from their money
and other property. Consideration should also be given to those fraud crimes
found outside the Criminal Code, such as the various forms of fraud in
obtaining welfare benefitsm and medical assistance,"' and in regard to
unemployment compensation- and worker's compensation."' Significant
frauds affecting substantial numbers of Wyoming citizens have been
perpetrated in recent years, and larger and more sophisticated fraudulent
schemes are inevitable. Wyoming's existing statutes on mislabeling
merchandise and false advertising are pitifully inadequate.12 The Legislature
should examine federal statutes and the statutes of other states, including other
western states such as Colorado. This is not to advocate the adoption of
Colorado's criminal fraud statutes, which present their own set of problems,
but simply to suggest that the experience of other states can be instructive.
X.

OTHER CRIMES

Chapters 4 through 9 of the Wyoming Criminal Code deal with a variety
of crimes ranging from offenses against morals, to offenses against public
administration and the public peace, to gambling, weapons and miscellany.
For the most part, these provisions have remained little changed since 1983,
and do not provide a high volume of criminal prosecutions or criminal appeals.

227. 29 L.R. Ch. Div. 459, 483 (1884).
228. WYO. STAT. ANN § 42-2-112 (Michie 1997).
229. ld. §42-4-111.
230. Id. § 27-3-702.
231. Id § 27-14-510.
232. Mislabeling merchandise is covered by Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-610, and false advertising by §
6-3-611. Both provide a maximum fine of $750, and no imprisonment. Given the greatly increased scale
of modern marketing, combined with the unfortunate tendency to offer for sale goods known to be
defective or which are misrepresented in some material aspect, the sanctions for merchandise fraud
should be increased by providing for suitable fines and imprisonment and aggregation of values should
be allowed when the fraudulent scheme affects numerous persons. These statutes which provide mild
punishment for persons marketing goods should be contrasted with section 6-3-404(b), which subjects to
possible felony punishment, including imprisonment for ten years, any person "who alters, defaces,
changes or removes a price tag or marker on or about property offered for sale by a wholesale or retail
store with intent to obtain the property at less than the marked or listed price," if the person attempts to
reduce the price by $500 or more. This offense is subject to aggregation of values in order to increase the
punishment to a felony. Id. § 6-3-410.
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Chapter 4, titled "Offenses Against Morals, Decency and Family,"
contains provisions on prostitution,"' public indecency,"m obscenity,21' and
desecrating graves and bodies, 2"' all of which state a public policy on moral
issues which in the whole is consistent with the beliefs of most Wyoming
citizens. While these sections are often vague, taken together they express
minimal standards of behavior in a manner which can provide a sound basis
for prosecution, particularly in egregious cases. The fact that few prosecutions
are brought under these sections is evidence that the public moral consensus
prevails. Chapter 4 also contains sections on bigamy,2"' incestn ' and child
abandonment,'V which again express publicly accepted standards of behavior.
Nevertheless, even though these statutes appear to be consistent with
behavioral standards, they should be subjected to periodic plenary review to
determine their continued adherence to public expectation and their adequacy
to fulfill that expectation.
Chapter 5 contains a wide variety of sections dealing with offenses by
public officials, interference with governmental functions, and perjury and
related crimes of falsehood. These provisions, too, need periodic review to
assure that they are adequate to deal with the abuses which threaten the
effective operation of government. Do the provisions on bribery and misuse of
official power and governmental property provide the necessary tools to deal
with occasional governmental corruption when it arises? Can viable
prosecutions be brought under these sections in light of modem governmental
fiscal practices? Are the penalties sufficient to provide adequate sanctions
against violators? In particular, are the possible fines unrealistically small?
Often, prosecutions will bring to light the shortcomings in these statutes.
For example, in Smith v. State,2"' relatives of a convicted armed robber
conspired to have the chief witness against the robber beaten up. Section 6-5305(a) is directed to the use of force or threats "to influence, intimidate or
impede a juror, witness or officer in the discharge of his duty." On appeal,
Smith claimed that since the victim had given his testimony before he was
attacked, the victim's duty had been fully discharged and he could no longer
be described as a witness, nor could he any longer be influenced, intimidated
or impeded in the discharge of his duty. The Wyoming Supreme Court held

233. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-4-101 to -103.

234. Id § 6-4-201.
235. Id. §§ 6-4-301 to-302.
236. Id. §§ 64-501 to-502.

237. Id. § 6-4-401.
238. Id § 6-4-402. Wyoming's incest statute is substantially broader than the common law, and follows the "modem" trend to include a number of sexually related activities-such as sexual contact-

which have not traditionally been considered incestuous.
239. Id. § 64-403.
240. 902 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1995).
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that until the case was finally terminated, either by affirmance on appeal or
through not taking an appeal within the time required, the trial witness
potentially could be called upon to testify again in the cause, and therefore his
duties had not terminated. As long as "the case has a possibility for further
proceedings in the trial court," a person retains his or her status as a witness.1'
Thus Smith's conviction was affirmed. But section 6-5-305(a) provides no
protection to a person after there is no possibility of further proceedings in the
trial court; a subsequent retributive attack upon a person who gave testimony
does not fall within the statute. Consideration should be given to expanding the
protection given by the Wyoming statute to persons who have served as
witnesses.
The definitions in section 6-7-101 of what constitutes gambling have
been amended four times since 1983. This illustrates the somewhat
schizophrenic attitude Wyoming citizens have regarding gambling: some
forms such as Calcutta wagering, bingo and raffles are tolerated so long as
they are conducted for charitable or nonprofit purposes. The statutes also allow
pari-mutuel wagering on horse races, including wagering at licensed premises
on televised races held outside Wyoming.214
Regarding other sections in these chapters of the Criminal Code, many of
the observations this author made fourteen years ago remain applicable
today.2'1 Ambiguities and omissions which were present in the 1982 Criminal
Code have remained unchanged; whether law enforcement or criminal
prosecutions have been hindered by those shortcomings in the Criminal Code
is problematic. It is likely that change will come only after it is perceived that
the present statutes are inadequate, and the barn door will be closed only when
some of the horses have escaped.
XI.

A.

SENTENCING

The Ninety PercentSolution: Section 7-13-201

In 1909, the Wyoming Legislature provided that each sentence to the
penitentiary, other than a life sentence, should consist of a minimum and a
maximum term: "[T]he court imposing the sentence shall not fix a definite
term of imprisonment, but shall establish a maximum and minimum term for
which said convict shall be held in prison."" Prisoners could be paroled after

241. Id. at1280.
242. Wyo. STAT. ANN.§§ 11-25-101 to -113.
243. See Theodore E. Lauer, Goodbye, 3-Card Monte: The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, 19
LAND & WATER L. REV. 107, 509 (1984).

244. 1909 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 84, § 1.The requirement that maximum and minimum terms be imposed is now found in WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-201.
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serving the minimum term .4" The shortcoming with this statute was that it
permitted sentencing courts to render early parole impossible by making the
minimum and maximum terms almost identical; thus sentences of nineteen
years and 364 days to twenty years could be and were imposed. In 1987, the
Legislature provided a partial corrective by specifying that the minimum term

could not be longer than ninety percent of the maximum term.2 " Thus, where
the statute permits a twenty year maximum term, the minimum can be no more
than eighteen years. The amendment has proved workable, except where the
mathematics has stumped the sentencing court.Y
B.

Life Imprisonment Without Parole

Article 4, Section 5 of the Wyoming Constitution gives the governor
"power to remit fines and forfeitures, to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of
impeachment." While persons sentenced to life imprisonment were not eligible
for parole,-" the governor could commute a life sentence to a term of years,
from which parole could be granted.
Concern arose that because there was no guarantee that a person
sentenced to life imprisonment could not be released from prison following a
commutation of his sentence, juries in capital cases might impose the death
penalty rather than a life sentence in order to assure that a defendant convicted
of first degree murder would never be released. Perhaps there was also worry
that the Governor, in exercising the power to commute life sentences, could
frustrate the public desire that serious offenders not be released. In 1994,
Wyoming voters amended the Wyoming Constitution by adding Article 3,
Section 53, which authorizes the Legislature to "create the penalty of life
imprisonment without parole for specified crimes which sentence shall not be
subject to commutation by the governor."
The intention of the public in amending the constitution was almost
certainly that there should be a mechanism guaranteeing that heinous
murderers, sentenced to life in prison, could never be released. However, the
Wyoming Legislature has not responded to this public expectation. No statute

245. 1909 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 84, § 3. Permitting parole only after the minimum sentence has been

served remains the law of Wyoming. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7.13-402(a).
246. 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 3 (codified at WYO.STAT. ANN. § 7-13-201).
247. The author has seen a sentence of 20 to 22 years.
248. 1947 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 20, § 2, authorized the board of pardons to "grant a parole, that is, he
may be permitted to leave the confines of the Institution in which he is confined, to any person imprisoned in any institution under sentence ordered by any District Court of this State, other than a life sentence." The present version of this act is found in Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7.13402(a), which places the
power in the board of parole, which may grant parole to any person who has served the minimum term,
"except a sentence of life imprisonment without parole or a life sentence." Id.
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has been enacted authorizing life sentences without parole in murder cases.
The Legislature has, however, provided that a person convicted of sexual
assault24' or of indecent liberties with a child under sixteen by a person at least
four years older,,' shall be sentenced to life without parole if the offender has
two previous convictions on charges separately brought for sexual assault or
indecent liberties on a child under sixteen by a person at least four years older.
The task before the Legislature is clear: it must satisfy public expectation
by specifying those forms of first degree murder for which there should be life
imprisonment without parole. The Legislature may be understandably
reluctant to provide that in all convictions for first degree murder, except
where the death penalty is imposed, the defendant shall be sentenced to life
without parole. But it should be possible to specify certain particularly heinous
kinds of first degree murder as punishable by life sentence without parole.
C. Fines as CriminalSanctions
The use of fines as an alternative to imprisonment may both accomplish
the punitive ends of criminal justice and save the costs of incarceration.
Wyoming courts appear to be increasing the creative use of money fines as
sanctions in criminal cases involving both misdemeanors and felonies. Statutes
defining crimes often authorize fines as well as imprisonment as punishment. "
Where a statute creating a felony makes no provision for a fine, section 6-10102 permits the court to impose a fine of not more than $10,000. Prior to 1982,
a fine of up to $1,000 could be imposed in felony cases.12'
Punishment for most misdemeanors is confined to the criminal
jurisdictional limits of justice of the peace courts: imprisonment for not more
than six months and a fine of not more than $750.'" Misdemeanors with a six
month, $750 maximum are often termed "petty misdemeanors," while
misdemeanors with greater penalties, such as imprisonment for not more than
a year, or a fine of up to $1,000 or even $2,000, are called "high
misdemeanors," and in counties with justice of the peace courts must be

249. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-306(d).
250. Id. § 14-3-105(b).
251. In felonies, other than crimes against persons, the practice of the 1982 Criminal Code seems to
be to authorize a fine of not more than $1,000 for each year for which imprisonment could be imposed.
Thus burglary, with maximum imprisonment of 10 years, has a maximum fine of S10,000. WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 6-3-30 1(b). Third degree arson, with maximum imprisonment of five years, has a maximum fine
of $5,000. Id. § 6-3-103. Where the maximum imprisonment for promoting prostitution is three years,
the maximum fine is $3,000. Id. § 6-4-103(b). There are some exceptions; aggravated burglary with
maximum imprisonment of 25 years, authorizes a maximum fine of $50,000. Id. § 6-3-301(c).
252. See, e.g, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-6 (Michie 1957).
253. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-116 (Michie 1997) states the jurisdictional limits of justice of the peace

courts in criminal cases. Section 6-10-103 provides that unless a different penalty is prescribed by law,
misdemeanors are punishable by a maximum of six months' imprisonment and a $750 fine.
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prosecuted in -the district court. Prior to 1982, maximum fines in
misdemeanors were generally $100, which was then the jurisdictional limit of
justice of the peace courts.TM The 1982 Wyoming Criminal Code increased the
maximum fines for most misdemeanors from $100 to $750.
It is important that the maximum amount of fines be adjusted from time
to time to compensate for inflation. More significantly, the Wyoming
Legislature needs to be aware of the national trend toward authorization of
substantial fines in felony cases. Large fines are particularly appropriate when
individuals and other enterprises engage in fraudulent schemes resulting in
significant loss to large numbers of persons. In general, conviction of federal
crimes which are felonies will carry fines up to $250,000 for individuals and
$500,000 for organizations.2' Some federal crimes authorize greater fines.
Thus, federal mail or wire and radio or television fraud which affects a
financial institution may be punished by a fine of $1,000,000.- Colorado
authorizes fines in felony cases ranging from $100,000 to $1,000,000Y
The structure of fines authorized in criminal cases needs to be
reexamined from time to time, to keep fines consistent with the added harms
incident to modem crime and with the ever-shrinking value of money. Fines
are a useful sanction in many criminal cases, and the courts should be armed
with the power to impose adequate and meaningful fines. At the same time,
recognition must be given to the finite financial capacity of many convicted
persons in light of the fiercely competitive demands for fines, victim
restitution and costs.
XII. CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982 has served Wyoming reasonably
well over the past fifteen years. Like all legislation, it needs to be
systematically and periodically reviewed to determine whether it continues to
serve its purpose. Some provisions are flawed; others could be expanded or
improved upon. A number are of questionable relevance to conditions in
Wyoming at the close of the twentieth century. New statutes are needed in
some areas to deal with the new complexities of the technological age. It is
appropriate at this time that the Wyoming Legislature undertake a study of the
Criminal Code, with the goal of making the Code a more effective
instrumentality to protect the lives and property of the people of Wyoming.

254. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-409 (Michie 1957), giving justices of the peace jurisdiction in
all cases less than felony where the punishment did not exceed six months imprisonment and a fine of
$100. The $100 limit for fines was first enacted in 1876. 1876 Wyo. Terr. Sess. Laws ch. 71, pt. 2, § 1.
255. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b),(c) (1994).
256. Id. §§ 1341, 1343.
257. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-l-105(l)(a)(Ill)(A) (1997).
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